The Effect of Selective Colleges on Student Partisanship

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Abstract

College-educated citizens are trending toward the political left across Western democracies, but the most politically powerful and left-leaning student bodies originate from a smaller number of highly selective institutions. Using data on over 250,000 applicants and a discontinuity in the University of California's admission rules, I estimate the impact of admissions to highly selective colleges in America's largest research university system on partisanship after college. Admissions to highly selective UC campuses reduce Republican registration and increase registration as independents or Democrats. Such admissions likewise raise primary election turnout, mostly through Democratic presidential contests. I use administrative data, surveys, and a poll of in-sample students to show that long-run mechanisms and on-campus peer socialization are plausible, but intentional efforts by faculty to influence their students are unlikely to explain these results.

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1 Introduction

College education is one of the strongest predictors of left-liberalism across Western democracies, with the most left-leaning student bodies originating from a smaller number of highly selective campuses (Abou Chadi and Hix, 2021; Gethin et al., 2021). Yet, there is no consensus on whether any type of college can substantively change its students' party preferences. Identifying the impact of colleges on partisanship is a key question for economics because such effects seriously complicate our understanding of the social returns to education. More specifically, even if public education spending has positive effects on earnings and political participation, the belief that higher education changes political views is cited by voters and policymakers across countries as a reason to distrust college governance, regulate curricula, and reduce public spending on higher education (Goldsmith and Vermeule, 2017; Salam, 2018; Parker, 2019; Novak, 2021; Firoozi and Geyn, 2023; Stratford, 2023).

Extant research suggests several ways higher education could impact students' party preferences. Roommates and classmates have a significant influence on students' policy views and partisanship.[1] Faculty, curricula, and instruction may shape these outcomes as well (Cantoni et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2023). The long-run effects of selective colleges on earnings, occupation, and residential choice could also impact political attitudes (Finan et al., 2021; Cantoni and Pons, 2022). Still, research on the aggregate partisan effects of colleges is split, because endogenous enrollment severely hinders causal inference.[2]

I estimate the impact of admission to highly selective colleges on student partisanship with a regression discontinuity design based on the University of California's (UC) admission rules, which granted an advantage to students in the top 4 percent of their high school cohort

[1]This literature uses variation in peer exposure to estimate the impact of peers on attitudes toward diversity (Boisjoly et al., 2006; Carrell et al., 2019; Alan et al., 2021; Corno et al., 2022), support for redistribution (Mendelberg et al., 2017; Londono-Velez, 2022), and overall partisanship or ideology (Billings et al., 2021; Strother et al., 2021).

[2]Papers that attempt to answer this question rely on identification strategies that involve matching students on observables (Hanson et al., 2012; Campbell and Horowitz, 2016; Doyle and Skinner, 2017; Strother et al., 2021; Scott, 2022; Simon, 2022). The only paper to use an instrument found that meeting the minimum admission cutoff for Romanian colleges increases social liberalism on issues like sexual orientation, prostitution, and drug addiction (Apfeld et al., 2022).

(Bleemer, 2021b). This setting is vital to studying the impact of colleges on partisanship for three reasons. First, California is the largest setting in the democratic world where most voters self-report their party preferences in administrative data.[3] Second, I am able to link tens of millions of voter registration records from all 50 American states to more than a quarter million college applicants and show that Californian college students' political cleavages are similar to those in other locations. Third, the UC's top percentile policy generates a discontinuity in admission to multiple campuses that allows for credible tests of causal effects and underlying assumptions.

Eligibility for the UC's top percentile policy increased admission rates from an average of 2.9 to 3.3 campuses. As a consequence, students in the top 4 percent of their cohort were 6 percentage points more likely to enroll at highly selective UCs, with half of counterfactual enrollment coming from less selective California State Universities, a quarter coming from less selective UCs, and a quarter coming from two-year colleges or non-enrollment. I find that each admission induced by the policy *reduces* an applicant's probability of Republican Party registration by 1.62 percentage points and *increases* registration as independents or Democrats by 4.98 percentage points. Given my survey evidence that in-sample registered Democrats and independents favor Democrats on ballot tests by 9 to 1 and 3 to 1 margins and registered Republicans favor their own party by a 3 to 1 margin, this suggests that UC admissions substantively shift political preferences to the left. Pivoting to turnout, I find that marginally admitted students also cast more votes in primary elections, mostly in Democratic Party presidential nominating contests. My results are robust to various RD implementation choices like adding covariates, more flexible controls for the running variable, alternative bandwidth selection, and two bias-aware methods of estimating confidence intervals (Calonico et al., 2014; Kolesar and Rothe, 2018).

[3]At roughly 15 million active partisans (3/4 of registered voters), California also has more party members in its administrative voting records than any other democratic country or American state. My survey of in-sample students shows that party registration closely tracks electoral and policy preferences. In-sample registered Democrats and registered independents favor Democrats by 9 to 1 and 3 to 1 margins on overall ballot tests, economic policy, and sociocultural issues. Registered Republicans likewise favor their own party by roughly 3 to 1 margins. For each registration status, donations by in-sample students are more lopsided.

I evaluate three plausible causal pathways: peer socialization during college, faculty or curriculum, and long-run mechanisms. Beginning with peer socialization during college, I find that selective colleges like UC campuses facilitate more intense peer exposure and have student bodies that are especially likely to shift their enrollees toward the political left. UC students self-report higher rates of living in student housing, discuss current events with friends more frequently, and cite their friends as their largest political influence, unlike their counterparts at less selective colleges. Students subject to the UC's top percentile policy are also exposed to peers who are more liberal and affluent, but are less Christian or White than peers at counterfactual institutions. In each case, differences between highly selective UCs and less selective colleges in California parallel those in other college sectors and locations.

Survey data from faculty suggest that intentional efforts to engage students in the political process or introduce current events into curricula do not explain the effects I observe. Despite leaning left relative to faculty at less selective campuses, UC faculty are more supportive of far-right speakers on campus and self-report fewer assignments on race and gender, less interest in influencing politics, changing social attitudes, and teaching their students citizenship, morals, or how to change society. Unlike their accurate beliefs about their peers being relatively liberal, UC students' do not accurately perceive the leftward lean of their faculty relative to those at less selective campuses. Causal evidence showing that the UC increases earnings, degree attainment, and graduate school attendance imply that these long-run mechanisms could affect partisanship or turnout by impacting longer-term policy views, priorities, or peer exposure.

This paper advances our understanding of political economy in three ways. First, I find that selective colleges shift partisanship toward the political left, demonstrating that college education shapes party preferences more broadly and complicating the valuation of education's civic externalities. Second, I show that selective colleges can alter partisanship through socialization and highlight that selectivity gradients in peer and faculty characteristics outside of California parallel those within my setting. Finally, I provide evidence that

the same types of colleges that confer higher income, social capital, and political clout also shift partisanship relative to other institutions, which suggests that my results are likely to understate the full impact of college education on the electoral and policymaking process.

2 The University of California in Context

California's public higher education system is divided into three tiers that specialize in different postsecondary roles. The California Community Colleges (CCC) focus on workforce training and two year degree programs, enrolling one out of four American community college students (CCCs, 2022). The California State University (CSU) system operates a network of local comprehensive universities that award bachelor and master's degrees, enrolling nearly half a million students each year. The UC system manages selective, research-focused doctoral institutions that educate over a quarter million students annually, with eight out of its nine undergraduate campuses classified at the R1 research activity level and seven with Association of American Universities membership (AAU, 2022).

California is an essential setting for estimating the effect of selective colleges on partisanship because its post-secondary system is similar to those in other locations and its political process offers unique data advantages. Although I track registration and party membership in all 50 American states and DC, roughly 4 out of 5 in-sample registrants live in California because it has the highest rate of college student retention in the US (Van Dam, 2022). Unlike most democratic countries, American states like California have voter registration records that include self-reported information on party membership for three quarters of registrants. Consistent with election records from college precincts and evidence from national opinion polls of youth, my survey of in-sample students shows that registered Democrats and independents favor Democrats on ballot tests and policy positions by a 9 to 1 and 3 to 1 margin and registered Republicans favor their own party by a 3 to 1 margin. Importantly, being a registered member of a particular party in California is not a requirement for participating

in any primary elections other than national presidential primaries. As a result, Californians are strictly motivated to register with the party that aligns best with their policy views, rather than also weighing strategic alignment with the dominant party in state politics.

UC students have historically been more left-leaning than peers at less selective colleges and non-college youth, a pattern which mirrors the education cleavage across the United States and other countries (Kerr et al., 2001a; Gethin et al., 2021). Despite California's leftward-lean, UC student partisanship (60 percent Democratic and 8 percent Republican) is strikingly similar to selective colleges in other settings like USC (59 percent to 9 percent), NYU (70 percent to 5 percent), Boston University (62 percent to 6 percent), the University of Arizona (50 percent to 15 percent), Stanford University (71 percent to 6 percent), the University of Michigan (56 percent to 10 percent), Cornell University (60 percent to 7 percent), and UT Austin (56 percent to 17 percent).[4] In both California and the United States, college seniors who attend relatively more selective colleges are more likely to favor the political left, regardless of whether their institution is private or public, secular or religious, and teaching or research focused (See Figure 1). I replicate this descriptive result by showing that selectivity and partisanship are correlated among in-sample UC applicants more than a decade after initial college application. Still, it is not obvious whether endogenous selection into enrollment can fully explain the student body's leftward skew or if the UC and other selective colleges have a causal effect on student partisanship and political preferences.

The UC has a common application system that allows prospective students to select the set of campuses to which they will apply. Individual UC campuses use their autonomy to select which students to admit based on their own review of applicants. Students then choose where to enroll based on their full portfolio of college acceptances. Historically, UC admission selected on a large number of academic and personal background variables, complicating

[4]These numbers come from registration totals among in-sample students at colleges where more than 150 in-sample students enrolled. Publicly available vote totals from campus precincts in the 2020 presidential election leads to similar results, with Joe Biden carrying roughly 90 percent of the vote at UC campuses, 83 percent at USC, 92 percent at NYU, 83 percent at Boston University, 80 percent at the University of Arizona, 94 percent at Stanford, 90 percent at the University of Michigan, 93 percent at Cornell University, and 83 percent at UT Austin.

identification of causal effects. However, in reaction to Proposition 209's prohibition on race-based affirmative action, the UC introduced a top percentile policy, generating an exogeneous discontinuity in the probability of admission for some in-state applicants (Hinrichs, 2012; Antonovics and Backes, 2014; Bleemer, 2021a).

Between 2001 and 2011, the UC granted an admission preference to Californian high school students in the top four percent of their class. To determine eligibility the UC asked participating high schools, which account for upward of 90 percent of the UC freshman applicants in my sample, to submit student transcripts to the UC Office of the President each year. A re-weighted version of GPA, herein called "reweighted GPA" for brevity, was calculated by assigning additional weight to college-level courses that met UC requirements and were taken during the sophomore or junior years of high school. The top four percent cutoff within each high school class was determined internally by the UC, and neither the thresholds nor students' ordinal ranking by reweighted GPA were disclosed publicly. Each of the UC campus admissions offices were notified of their applicants eligibility for this policy and were allowed to individually determine which students were admitted.[5]

Like top percentile policies or minimum score policies in other contexts, this setting lends itself to a clear regression discontinuity design (RDD) identification strategy for estimating the causal effects of access to particular colleges (Long, 2004; Hoekstra, 2009; Niu and Tienda, 2010; Zimmerman, 2014; Kirkeboen et al., 2016; Sekhri, 2020; Black et al., 2021; Anelli, 2020). California's program, known as "Eligibility in the Local Context", is shown to have generated sizable increases in bachelor degree attainment and early career earnings in Bleemer (2021b) by absorbing students into highly selective UC campuses at the expense of the least selective UCs, CSUs, two year colleges, and non-enrollment in college. I advance the literature on political economy and labor economics by using California's top percentile policy as a natural experiment to study the impact of selective colleges on student partisanship.

[5]Multiple UC campuses granted preferential access to students in the top four percent, changing the composition of colleges they attend along several dimensions as I show in Section 4.1.

3 Research Design and Data

3.1 Data

I use a merged, de-identified panel of more than 250 thousand college applicants from the last five years of California's top percentile policy to test the impact of UC admission on partisanship. My student-level dataset draws on linked administrative records from commercial, academic, and government sources. Political and commercial data come from the L2 voter file, which includes voter registration and election participation from the State of California. Records for a majority of UC applicants were provided by an anonymous public college, herein referred to as "UC San Andreas", which merged individual-level data on name and birthdate and de-identified them prior to use. I further link data from administrative sources and surveys of students and faculty to assess the plausibility of several causal pathways.

L2 Inc. is a non-partisan, private vendor of political data used by electoral campaigns and researchers. I access their complete California VM2 voter file which includes records on the roughly 21 million Californians who are registered to vote, their political party membership, changes in their party status over time, as well as their participation in every primary and general election dating back to 2012.[6] This dataset is appended with the same records on all students who eventually registered to vote outside the state of California, allowing me to track in-sample students political outcomes in all 50 American states and DC. Supplemental commercial data on Californians within the file also provide a broader set of outcomes of interest, including detailed data on the locations where registrants live.

The administrative data file from UC San Andreas consists of more than 250,000 students who submitted an application to the campus between the years 2007 and 2011. While it would be theoretically preferable to use records on all UC applicants, there is a trade-off between sample size and data detail. The UC has a common application system with campus-specific modules that, in practice, leads a majority of California residents who ap-

[6]Changes in party membership are included exclusively for Californian registrants as other state voter files do not track these changes over time.

plied to any UC campus to apply at UC San Andreas. Using campus-specific application data reduces the total sample size, but comes with the benefit of additional variables on student background.[7] Individual-level records are linked to college enrollment from the National Student Clearinghouse assessed in the fall term following initial UC application. The colleges at which students enroll are linked to institutional characteristics from IPEDS, Opportunity Insights, and the College Scorecard.

To characterize the typical views of entering college freshmen and to capture faculty characteristics, I use publicly available data from large-scale surveys coordinated by the Cooperative Institutional Research Program (CIRP) housed at UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute (HERI). For students, I rely on a sample of more than 4 million entering first time full-time freshmen from CIRP's annual Freshman Survey between 2000 and 2010 at over one thousand institutions. The summary statistics of interest are students' partisan and religious self-identification, as well as their views on economic and sociocultural issues. For faculty, I use data from more than 80 thousand people across more than one thousand institutions included in HERI's triennial faculty surveys between 1989 and 1998.[8] Ideological leanings, instructional methods, personal goals, and a variety of other self-reported views and characteristics are used to identify differences between faculty across different higher education institutions.

Finally, I include linked data from a proprietary survey of 1,105 respondents sent to the full sample of UC San Andreas applicants between May 24th and June 7th, 2022 to assess the plausibility of causal mechanisms and to provide descriptive statistics. Appendix Table A.1 compares the characteristics of these survey takers to those of the full sample and Online Appendix A provides the text of all questions and potential responses. The survey questions solicit respondents' normative policy views, positive factual views, civic engagement, and self-reported beliefs about what influenced their political identity and behavior. The text

[7] I address potential concerns related to identification from this sample in Section 3.2.

[8] Later years are not publicly available to protect the identity of faculty members responding to the survey.

for many of these questions are drawn verbatim or adapted from recent Pew Research opinion polls to allow for the population of in-sample students to be benchmarked relative to the full adult population in the United States. I derive two measures of economic and sociocultural policy views to help descriptively characterize students within a two-dimensional normative policy space (See Figure A.1).

3.2 Regression Discontinuity Design

The UC's top percentile policy is an ideal setting for a regression discontinuity design given the satisfaction of two important assumptions (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960). The first assumption is the exclusion restriction. Because students' rankings are visible only to UC administrators and based on a proprietary and reweighted version of GPA, it is not feasible that the top percentile policy impacted political identity or action through pathways other than college application, admission, and enrollment. Second, there must be imperfect control of the running variable around the cutoff. Given that students were unaware of their reweighted GPA's ordinal ranking within their graduating class, this assumption is credible. The admission rule likewise limits administrator discretion, preventing the selection of cutoffs that would favor or disfavor particular college applicants. The primary threat to the identification strategy's validity in this setting, therefore, comes from the risk that a subset of applicants who were made aware of their eligibility for the top percentile policy selected into UC San Andreas application differentially across the GPA eligibility threshold.

I evaluate this risk empirically by testing for discontinuous jumps in student characteristics and the density of observations around the cutoff. There is little visual evidence of a sudden rise in density above the cutoff (see Figure C.1) and I fail to reject the null hypothesis of a smooth density of observations around the threshold.[9] As I show in Tables C.1 through C.5 and Figures C.2 through C.6, predicted outcomes and student characteristics also trend smoothly around the 96th percentile. I find that for 16 predicted outcomes cor-

[9]I fail to reject the null hypothesis of a smooth density of observations using a second order or other higher order polynomial following the existing literature (McCrary, 2008; Cattaneo et al., 2018, 2019).

responding to all of my outcomes of interest along with 18 covariates, none reject the null hypothesis of a continuous trend using local linear estimation with a 0.3 GPA bandwidth at a 90 percent confidence interval, which is in line with a random rejection rate. After predicting partisanship conditional on registration in Table C.3, I find that students in the top 4 percent of their high school cohort are an insignificant 0.01 percentage points more likely to be Republican and 0.01 percentage points less likely to be a registered Democrat or independent than their peers just outside the top 4 percent. The evidence of balance is similar at narrower bandwidths, with one rejection out of 34 variables at a 90 percent confidence interval using local linear estimation at the MSE-optimal bandwidth (see Figures C.7 through C.11). The output of these balance tests are consistent with the expectation that students are not capable of systematic sorting around the top four percent threshold and do not select differentially into UC San Andreas application based on eligibility for the policy.

Taking continuity of the conditional expectations function as given, the general form of the RD equation is:

$$Outcome_i = \alpha + \beta Eligible_i + f(GPA_i) + \mathbf{X}_i'\Omega + \varepsilon_i, \tag{1}$$

where $Outcome_i$ is an outcome for student i, GPA_i is a student's reweighted GPA with the 96th percentile cutoff normalized to zero, $Eligible_i = \mathbb{I}[GPA_i \geq 0]$ is a binary variable for a student being in the top four percent of their high school class by reweighted GPA, $f(\cdot)$ is a continuous function, $\mathbf{X}_i$ is a vector of covariates, and ε_i is an idiosyncratic error term with standard errors clustered on high school cohort. Assuming the RD assumptions hold, my $\hat{\beta}$ estimate identifies the average effect of the top percentile admission policy among students local to the threshold. I vary the order of a polynomial control for the running variable, include an expansive set of controls, change the bandwidth used for inference, and estimate bias-aware confidence intervals to demonstrate the robustness of my estimates (Calonico

et al., 2014; Kolesar and Rothe, 2018).[10]

4 Results

4.1 First-Stage Effects

I focus on reduced-form effects, because scoring above the 96th percentile threshold impacts multiple dimensions of admission and enrollment, violating the exclusion restriction.[11] I also present IV estimates using aggregate UC admissions as the treatment to help interpret magnitudes. I view aggregate UC admissions as a better measure of treatment than a binary variable for admission to any UC or enrollment outcomes, because of substitution between UC campuses and less severe exclusion restriction violations. Substitution between UC campuses matters because there are meaningful within-system differences in campus characteristics that may act as causal mechanisms. The exclusion restriction is violated for many enrollment measures because enrollment changes along multiple dimensions.[12] Using UC campus admissions as a first-stage has the added benefit of interpretability, because the top percentile policy acts by broadening an applicant's enrollment options, not by compelling attendance at particular institutions.

I begin by illustrating the impact of the UC's top percentile policy on UC applications and admissions. The UC conferred a significant admissions advantage to college applicants

[10]The controls I use include parental years of schooling, self-reported income, and ISIR family income, as well as indicators for female, underrepresented minority status, Cal Grant eligibility, first generation college student status, FAFSA filing, application year, county education level, high school quality, having a single parent, and missing covariate information. I use the bounded second derivative method from Kolesar and Rothe (2018), deriving bounds based on a heuristic rule offered by the authors that makes assumptions on the maximum plausible difference between the CEF and a straight line between the CEF values at the endpoints of an interval of a fixed length in the support of the running variable.

[11]It is worth noting that reduced-form effects are also preferable because the composition of a prospective student's college applications, which includes campuses outside of the UC system, is unobserved.

[12]This leads the net changes I observe for any single measure of enrollment to understate the gross proportion of applicants who change their enrollment decision. The result would be both overstated IV estimates for enrollment and the potential for misattribution of the effect to one particular enrollment characteristic, when another is more consequential. Aggregate UC admissions faces an analogous but less severe problem if eligibility for top percentile admission increases college application rates outside of the UC or changes the composition of UCs to which eligible students apply.

who ranked marginally above the 96th percentile of reweighted GPA. Interestingly, it did so without impacting the aggregate number of UC campuses to which such students applied. I illustrate this visually in Figure 1 by plotting against students' centered GPA values (1) the number of UC campuses to which they applied in gray and (2) the number of UC campuses to which students were admitted in black. Just below the threshold for eligibility, the typical student applied to roughly 4.5 and was admitted to just under 3 UC campuses. While there is a discrete jump in the number of admissions, there is no comparable change in the aggregate number of UC applications.

I show the estimates for these outcomes explicitly in Table 2, varying the inclusion of covariate controls, the order of a polynomial control for the running variable, and the bandwidth used between 0.3 GPA points and the MSE-optimal bandwidth (Calonico et al., 2020). I find consistently across specifications that there are no meaningful or statistically significant changes in UC application rates at a 90 percent confidence interval. However, there is a sizable discontinuity in UC admission rates on the order of roughly 0.4 campuses at the threshold. Although I prefer the reduced-form estimates throughout this paper, I use this admission effect as a first-stage to understand the scale of the top percentile policy's impact.

Turning to enrollment, I demonstrate that the UC's top percentile admission policy changes the enrollment patterns of policy-eligible students along multiple dimensions. Conferring an admission advantage at the UC increased enrollment at both the extensive margin of four-year college attendance and the intensive margin of selectivity, in part by attracting students to highly selective UC campuses from CSUs and, to a smaller degree, from less selective UCs, two-year colleges, or non-enrollment in college.

In Figure 2, I illustrate the effect of the UC's top percentile policy on UC application success rates, and enrollment in UCs, CSUs, private Californian colleges, out-of-state colleges, and two-year colleges or no college enrollment.[13] The final two panels in the figure decom-

[13]UC application success rates refer to the ratio between the number of UC campuses an applicant was admitted to and the number of UC campuses to which they applied.

pose four year colleges by a collapsed version of Opportunity Insights' selectivity ratings.[14] I find that student enrollment rises at highly selective colleges and UCs, primarily at the expense of CSUs, less selective colleges, and non-enrollment in college. Specifically, I find a 6 percentage point increase in highly selective colleges, driven by UCs in this category, with one quarter of counterfactual enrollment coming from two-year colleges or non-enrollment, half coming from CSUs, and the final quarter coming from UCs below the "Highly Selective" category. Figure 3 illustrates that students flow to UC campuses with higher instructional expenditures, applicant rejection rates, timely graduation rates, and median graduate earnings than countercactual institutions. I demonstrate robustness by testing each of these intermediate outcomes across six different specifications in Tables 3 and 4, finding similar results across each.

4.2 Voter Registration and Partisanship

In Figure 4, I begin my main analysis by plotting eight voter registration outcomes against students' reweighted GPAs normalized to the top four percent cutoff within their high school class. The first six panels show the total fraction of students who are registered to vote in the United States, as well as the unconditional share who registered as Republicans, non-Republicans, Democrats, no party preference, and third parties. I note that Democrats and independents are both pooled and measured separately because, consistent with evidence from national opinion polls of youth and precinct voting patterns from college campuses, in-sample independent voters favor Democrats on ballot tests by a 3 to 1 margin and are more than twice as ideologically proximiate to Democrats as Republicans (See Figure A.2 and Tables A.2 and A.3). The last two panels round out the figure by illustrating the unconditional proportion of students who switched between the major parties since first registering to vote. From initial inspection, there are clear discontinuities. Students eligible

[14] Four-year colleges rated highly selective or better are categorized as "Highly Selective", four year colleges rated selective or below are labeled "Selective", and all other enrollment categories are grouped into "2 Year/No College".

for the top percentile admission policy are less likely to register with the Republican Party or to switch from the Democratic to Republican Party, whereas there is a substantial increase in the rate at which students register no party preference or as an independent or Democrat. Other effects appear less precisely identified.

I test these unconditional outcomes formally in Table 5, dividing them into three panels. The first displays total voter registration rates, the second shows unconditional party registration, and the third tracks changes in major party registration since a student first registered to vote. Each column reflects a different specification, varying the inclusion of covariates, bandwidth selection, and the order of a polynomial control for the running variable. Beginning with Panel A, I demonstrate that there is an imprecisely estimated, positive effect on the rate at which students register to vote, consistent with what previous research suggests about the effects of higher education on civic participation (Firoozi and Geyn, 2023). The increase in registration is roughly 1 to 3 percentage points for each UC campus admission induced by the policy (see Table B.1).

Turning to Panel B, I find that admission to the UC system significantly changes the partisanship of students by the time they are roughly 30 years old. In my preferred specification in Column 3, I find that for every 1,000 applicants who are eligible for the UC's top percentile policy, approximately six are dissuaded from registering as Republicans and 19 are persuaded to register as an independent or Democrat. I note that the former figure is likely much closer to a true representation of two-party policy preferences, as an overwhelming share of students in all non-Republican registration statuses favors the Democratic Party on policy issues.[15] On a relative basis, my IV estimates imply that each UC admission induced by the policy reduces the probability a student will register as Republican by 1.62

[15]Figure A.2 as well as Tables A.2 and A.3 highlight how all registration statuses other than registered Republicans favor the Democratic Party by large margins and have left-wing economic and progressive social issue views. When I apply data from my in-sample student poll in Table A.2 and use party registration cells to impute the probability a student favors a given major political party on policy issues, I find a 0.4 to 0.6 percentage point increase in the share of students favoring the Democratic Party under my preferred specification. This result is significant at a 95 percent confidence interval and is robust to using party registration-by-college enrollment sector cells to impute the probability a student favors a given major political party on policy issues.

percentage points and increases independent or Democratic registration by 4.98 percentage points (see Table B.1). In context, the point estimates mean that the 823,961 UC admissions over the 2007 to 2011 sample timeframe reduced the total number of registered Republicans in California by 13,348 people (0.3 percent of California's total) and raised the number of independents and Democrats by 41,033 people (0.3 percent of California's total).

Panel C closes out the analysis of voter registration by demonstrating the impact of UC admission on conversion rates between the major political parties among students who reside in California. The L2 voter file designates someone as a convert if they currently affiliate with one of the two major parties, but at any point in their past were registered with the opposing one. While I do not find a significant impact on the rate at which students convert from the Republican to Democratic Party, I note that the rate of conversions from Democratic to Republican decline by two out of every 1,000 near threshold college applicants. This implies that the effects of UC admission on partisanship do not fade away as students approach middle age.

As I demonstrate in Table 5, these findings are robust to alternative specifications that vary the inclusion of covariates, alternate the selection of bandwidth between 0.3 GPA points and the MSE-optimal value from Calonico et al. (2020), and raise the order of a polynomial control for the running variable. Online Appendix Tables D.1 through D.3 further illustrate robustness to two methods of estimating bias-aware confidence intervals and the inclusion of high dimensional high school-year fixed effects (Calonico et al., 2014; Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). I provide more flexible robustness tests for each outcome of interest in Appendix Figures D.1 through D.8. Each figure includes four panels that show the point estimate and confidence interval for a particular outcome across a range of potential bandwidths, alternating the inclusion of covariates and the choice of a linear or quadratic control for the running variable. On balance, I find that the point estimates are stable across bandwidth and specification with precision declining as expected at narrower bandwidths.

To ensure that the results I observe for party registration and conversion rates are not

simply a statistical artifact of a noisy outcome variable, I perform a set of falsification tests. I generate a "synthetic cutoff" at each feasible point along normalized reweighted GPA, and estimate the impact of this synthetic policy across four specifications that vary the inclusion of covariates and the use of a quadratic control for the running variable.[16] I then compare the t-statistic of my results at the true threshold to the cumulative distribution of t-statistics from these synthetic cutoffs in Appendix Figures E.1 through E.3. The results are in line with the findings in Table 5, with all point estimates above the 95th percentile of synthetic estimated t-statistics.

4.3 Voter Turnout

Given the UC's observed impact on partisanship and extant research on the civic externalities of education, it is important to test the university system's effects on voter turnout (Firoozi and Geyn, 2023). Starting with Figure 5, I plot eight different measures of voter turnout. First, I show the extensive margin of ever having participated in a regular election and a measure of the total ballots a student cast in regular elections.[17] Next, I decompose the total number of ballots a student cast between 2012 and 2020 by whether they were cast in a presidential or midterm election cycle as well as by whether they were cast in a primary or general election. Finally, the bottom two panels illustrate the number of ballots cast in Republican and Democratic presidential primaries between 2012 and 2020. I find clear visual evidence of an increase in primary ballots cast, particularly in Democratic presidential primaries, and note noisy, positive increases in all other margins of voter turnout beside Republican primary participation.

Table 6 reflects the results for each of the eight voter turnout outcomes in the preceding

[16] Feasible points refers to each point between -1.24 and +0.27 relative to the true cutoff on the normalized reweighted GPA index, which allows the 0.3 GPA bandwidth to span the range of roughly the 1st to 99th percentiles of this normalized index. I use a 0.3 GPA bandwidth consistent with my preferred specification for a more direct comparison. I exclude discontinuities within a 0.05 GPA bandwidth of the true cutoff to avoid generating false positives by hewing too closely to the true policy cutoff.

[17] Regular elections in this context refers to all elections coinciding with primary or general elections for federal offices, excluding special elections.

figure. Following the same order, Panel A highlights total election participation, Panel B decomposes the number of ballots cast between 2012 and 2020 by the type of election cycle, Panel C decomposes the number of ballots cast by whether they were a primary or general election, and Panel D closes out the table with the number of ballots cast in Republican and Democratic presidential primaries. Each column represents a different specification, varying the RDD bandwidth, inclusion of covariate controls, and the order of a polynomial control for the running variable. Consistent with the visual evidence of discontinuities in Figure 5, I find that the UC's top percentile policy increases the number of ballots students eventually cast in primary elections by roughly 0.07 to 0.11 votes for each additional UC admission, with most of the effect accruing to Democratic presidential primaries (see Table B.2). Estimates of turnout effects in other elections are positive, with the exception of Republican presidential primaries, but too imprecisely identified to distinguish from zero.

For robustness checks and falsification tests I repeat the procedures used in Section 4.2. Tables D.4 through D.6 reflect my main estimates for these outcomes using bias-aware confidence intervals and with high dimensional high school-year fixed effects (Calonico et al., 2014; Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). I also demonstrate the robustness of my point estimates across the full range of potential bandwidths, varying both the order of a polynomial control for the running variable and the inclusion of covariate controls in Appendix Figures D.9 through D.16. For most outcomes, point estimates are fairly stable across bandwidth and specification but are less consistent than those of registration outcomes. I also reproduce the "synthetic threshold" falsification test for primary election ballots and Democratic presidential primaries in Appendix Figures E.4 and E.5, finding that 4 out of 8 specifications exceed the 95th percentile of synthetic t-statistics at other thresholds and all specifications exceed the 90th percentile of synthetic t-statistics.

5 Discussion

Changing admission and enrollment decisions alters student experiences along multiple dimensions, because colleges are a bundled set of treatments. For simplicity, I focus on three causal pathways supported by extant research for which data and evidence are available: peer socialization during college, UC faculty or curriculum, and long-run mechanisms. I argue that the evidence is more consistent with the peer and long-run explanations than faculty, but am also careful to note that this does not imply that faculty or curriculum are immaterial in this or other contexts.

5.1 Peer Socialization during College

Peer socialization during college is a potentially important causal pathway that could explain the UC's impact on both partisanship and turnout. Prior research has demonstrated that spending substantial amounts of time with peers in college dormitories, classrooms, and other settings can influence a students' policy views and political ideology. I evaluate differences in peer composition at the threshold and find that UC admission changes the characteristics of a students' college peers along four dimensions that have been suggested as important in the extant literature: race and ethnicity, socioeconomic status, religious identity, and ideology.[18] The effects I find on peer composition, as well as evidence suggesting more intense socialization at selective colleges from my survey of in-sample students, point to an important role for peers in the development of political identity and behavior.

First, educational peers' racial composition and socioeconomic status can have a consequential impact on students' policy views and partisanship (Boisjoly et al., 2006; Mendelberg et al., 2017; Londono-Velez, 2022; Billings et al., 2021). Figure 6 demonstrates that the UC's top percentile policy drew students toward campuses that differed from counterfactual col-

[18]While my data are from peers attending the same college, I note that the phrase "peer socialization during college" is used because students may also interact with other young people off-campus. In practice, I expect that same-college peers are a good proxy for off-campus peers because student social networks are likely to originiate on-campus and because alumni are common in university town centers.

leges in both racial and socioeconomic composition. Students enrolling at highly selective UCs were exposed to peers who were less likely to be White or Hispanic and were more likely to be affluent, Asian Americans, or international students.[19] Table 7 displays the results formally across six specifications. Crossing the eligibility threshold led to a 1.2 percentage point increase in peers from the top 5 percent of the income distribution, a 3,000 dollar increase in median peer household income, and a 1.3 percentage point increase in Asian Americans or international students.[20]

Second, students' policy views or behavior may be directly influenced by the religious or ideological views of their college peers (Uecker et al., 2007; Braghieri, 2021). Strother et al. (2021) find that college freshmen converge toward the ideological views of their exogeneously assigned roommates, with conservative entering freshmen especially elastic to the views of liberals. In Table F.1, a large-scale survey demonstrates that entering UC students are more likely to self-identify as liberal or far-left than entering students at private colleges, CSU campuses, and community colleges.[21] This higher rate of left-liberal self-identification maps to both left-wing economic policy and progressive sociocultural values (See Tables F.2 through F.6). The latter may be related to the lower fraction of UC students who self-identify as Christians relative to those who are Jewish, members of other faiths, or secular (See Table F.7).

To test differences in peer ideology and religious views across the threshold, I impute these characteristics at the campus level using a mix of voter registration records and CIRP surveys from HERI.[22] The first five panels and rows of Figure 7 and Table 8 illustrate the

[19]These patterns mirror the differences in survey data between incoming UC students and their counterparts at counterfactual colleges and universities in Table F.7.

[20]I note that the racial composition numbers are likely lower bounds on the true point estimate, because the racial composition data from Opportunity insights lag behind the time period I study.

[21]The ideological and religious gaps between UC students and their counterparts at less selective Californian colleges mirror the nationwide gap between students of more selective research universities and less selective teaching colleges (See Tables F.8 through F.9).

[22]Using data available in the CIRP survey, I match summary data on entering freshmen to colleges based on their membership in one of the following groups: UCs, private Californian research universities, CSUs, private Californian teaching colleges, two year Californian colleges or no college enrollment, public out-of-state research universities, private out-of-state research universities, public out-of-state teaching colleges, private out-of-state teaching colleges, and two year out-of-state teaching colleges. Note that the method of

imputed proportion of students who identify as far-right, conservative, centrist, liberal, and far-left. The GOP graduate share represents the fraction of registered voters who attended a particular college that were a member of the Republican Party in 2021 using in-sample data.[23] Across each measure of partisanship and each specification, I find that access to the UC leads students to enroll at colleges with more left-leaning peers and fewer classmates who will eventually register to vote as Republicans. The sectarian polarization I find in Figure 8 and Table 9 parallels the observed ideological polarization, with students exposed to fewer Christians and more classmates who are secular or members of minority faiths.

Self-reported data from my proprietary survey of in-sample students suggest a role for both peer composition and more intense socialization at selective colleges. Former UC students state that their friends were as large an influence on their political views as their family and significantly more influential than their professors, teachers, or coworkers (see Table A.4). Likewise, respondents state that they discussed current events during college and with friends more frequently than they have with their family (see Tables A.5 through A.7). Descriptive differences across college sector appear consistent with a peer effects mechanism as well. Tables A.4 through A.10 show that UC students, relative to their counterparts at less selective colleges, are significantly more likely to report ever living with other college students, feel greater political influence from their friends relative to their family, and have more liberal friends. Each of these traits are associated with students holding more left-wing views on economic policy and more progressive views on sociocultural issues.

5.2 Faculty and Curricula

Some policymakers have posited faculty and instruction as mechanisms underlying the political effects of university education, even motivating curricula regulations, tenure limits,

imputation I use will likely understate the ideological gap because (1) these surveys exclude sophomores, juniors, and seniors, (2) this method treats college non-enrollees as two year college students and (3) this method homogenizes peer characteristics across broad categories of colleges and, therefore, fails to capture intra-system changes in enrollment.

[23] This should tend to understate political differences between campuses because I draw only from a sample of UC applicants.

and budget cuts on this basis (Anders, 2021; Anderson and Svrluga, 2022; Beck, 2022; Korpar, 2022; Stratford, 2023). To that effect, changes to curriculua have been shown to be a powerful determinant of students' ideological values (Cantoni et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2023). Even setting aside intentional efforts at persuasion, college coursework and teaching materials may play an unintended role in shaping students' political identity, with recent work suggesting higher education may contribute to increased "moral certainty" (Stubager, 2008; Brocic and Miles, 2021). I combine data on self-reported faculty ideology, goals, and instruction with surveys of in-sample students to evaluate what, if any, role faculty or curricula may play.

I start with HERI faculty survey data and replicate my method for imputing ideology from Section 5.1 to test whether or not a faculty ideological gradient exists in this setting. Table G.1 shows that UC faculty self-identify as more left-leaning than their counterparts at other, less selective colleges and universities but are less supportive of prohibiting speech they deem racist or sexist (See Table G.2). The institutional polarization of faculty seen in Table G.3 cuts across both STEM and non-STEM disciplines. Consequently, Figure 9 and Table 10 find a significant jump in the share of left-liberal faculty at institutions students choose to attend at the UC's top percentile policy threshold.

Although UC faculty, like UC students, are more left-leaning than their colleagues at less selective colleges, they express far less interest in influencing politics, society, or their students. As Table G.4 illustrates, UC faculty list their foremost career objectives as "obtaining recognition" and "becoming an authority" in their field, self-reporting less emphasis on influencing the political structure, changing social values, and helping to promote racial understanding. UC faculty view the goal of undergraduate instruction as "developing students' ability to think clearly" and, relative to their counterparts at less selective and teaching-focused institutions, state in Table G.5 that developing students' moral character, helping them develop personal values, enhancing their appreciation of other races, and preparing them for responsible citizenship are less important.

These patterns align with what UC faculty see as the UC system's objectives and are reflected in instructional differences. Table G.6 shows that UC faculty, relative to their counterparts at less selective and teaching-focused colleges, report greater institutional commitment to respecting differences of opinion and promoting the intellectual development of students, but less dedication to helping students change society, supporting multiculturalism, and helping students understand their values. The gap in goals appears to manifest in curricula and teaching strategies that rely on less interactive methods, fewer readings on race or gender, and more extensive use of teaching assistants and traditional "chalk and talk" lectures (See Tables G.7 and G.8). Pedagogical differences may also be linked to the greater likelihood of holding tenure line appointments, working in STEM fields, and self-reported prioritization of research over instruction (See Table G.9 and Table G.10).[24]

While the suggestive evidence I find is inconsistent with intentional efforts by faculty to shape student views, unintentional differences in instruction and courses are certainly plausible. As one example, it is possible that UC students take classes that are academic rather than career-oriented and that this has an impact on political identity. As another example, UC faculty may unintentionally teach courses in ways that change student beliefs by emphasizing different skills or knowledge. Such causal pathways are difficult to detect in cross-campus policy settings, but I note that there are significant differences in positive (factual) beliefs between UC and CSU students that may be consistent with them. Even after controlling for GPA, UC students are more likely to agree that there is a scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change, a long-run decline in violent crime rates, and a far higher death rate from COVID-19 than influenza or pneumonia.

For their part, in-sample students state in my proprietary survey that their educators were a substantially less important determinant of their politics than friends or family. Although self-reported faculty and teacher influence are predictive of more left-wing economic views

[24]The relative differences between faculty at the UC and CSU parallel the gaps between selective research universities and less selective teaching colleges nationwide. I show this pattern for ideology in Table G.11 and can provide the corresponding tables of nationwide faculty on all other characteristics upon request.

and progressive sociocultural views, perceptions of educator ideology are negatively, if at all, associated with students' economic and sociocultural views, unlike perceptions of friends and family ideology. Compared to their CSU counterparts, UC students do not cite their educators as substantially more influential and do not perceive them as significantly more liberal, despite higher rates of left-liberal self-identification among UC faculty (see Tables A.4 and A.11).

5.3 Long-Run Mechanisms

The impact of the UCs top percentile policy on enrollment may manifest in long-run mechanisms like eventual degree attainment, earnings, neighborhood selection, and household composition. These in turn may influence student partisanship given strong geographic sorting by political views and clear political cleavages by these characteristics. I discuss the effects of UC admission in the context of existing research on earnings and degree attainment and then turn to other long-run mechanisms for which I have available evidence, like neighborhoods and household composition.

My findings on college enrollment closely mirror those of Bleemer (2021b), who demonstrates that the UC's top percentile policy led to sharp increases in five year bachelor's degree completion, post-graduation earnings, and graduate school attendance. These outcomes could be consequential for two reasons. First, higher rates of degree attainment and graduate school attendance may directly change the composition of later-life peers to which a former UC applicant is exposed. Second, the indirect, accompanying change in earnings or career path induced by degree attainment may influence students' partisanship and turnout.

Given that the policy generated a substantial increase in early career earnings, it is worth noting that the existing literature on income and partisanship is mixed. Predictions from theoretical models suggest higher earnings should be associated with less support for redistribution and the political left (Romer, 1975; Meltzer and Richard, 1981). Marshall (2016, 2019) finds that increases in earnings induced by compulsory K-12 schooling laws

in the mid-20th Century tilted students toward right-wing parties. However, it is possible that the direction of this mechanism does not generalize to the UC in the late 2000s. The education cleavage has reversed in Western democracies since the 1950s and compulsory schooling laws generated more liberal attitudes toward immigration in continental Europe (Cavaille and Marshall, 2019; Gethin et al., 2021). Work using more recent theory and data has also suggested that greater earnings may encourage voters to cast ballots based on sociocultural views rather than economic policies, which may push students toward the left in settings where voters, like UC applicants, are more socioculturally progressive than they are in favor of redistribution (Enke, 2020; Brocic and Miles, 2021; Enke et al., 2022).

Later-life peers like neighbhors, household members, and coworkers are another causal pathway through which the policy may impact partisanship and turnout. In particular, neighbors are both a direct plausible mechanism and a potential proxy of the differences in other later-life peers to which a former UC applicant may be exposed (Chyn and Haggag, 2019; Finan et al., 2021; Cantoni and Pons, 2022). Figure 10 and Table 11 test for differences in neighborhood median educational attainment, median income, and neighborhood partisanship for the sample of students observed in L2's California voter file. I find that, conditional on voter registration in California, there is little difference in students' eventual neighborhood characteristics across the threshold. There is, similarly, little evidence of differences in household partisanship or registration numbers.

6 Conclusion

I use a discontinuity in UC admission rules as a natural experiment to test the effects of highly selective colleges on students' partisanship. Because the UC's admission process favored students in the top four percent of their high school cohort, comparing applicants within a small bandwidth of the threshold allows identification of the universities' impact without the threat of endogeneity. I find that each admission to the UC system induced

by the policy reduces the probability an applicant will register as a Republican, raises independent or Democratic registration, and increases voter turnout in primaries, mostly in Democratic presidential contests.

Suggestive evidence is more consistent with peer socialization during college and long-run mechanisms than intentional efforts by faculty or curricula. Students who attend UC campuses as a result of the policy are exposed to more secular and left-leaning peers, live with other college students more often, and are more likely to attain a bachelor's degree, earn higher incomes, and enroll in graduate school. UC faculty also lean left relative to their counterparts at less selective colleges, but self-report greater support for allowing speeches by far-right speakers and much less interest in influencing politics, society, and their students' civic engagement. As the HERI data demonstrate, the gradients in student and faculty characteristics within California parallel those in other higher education settings.

This paper contributes to research on political economy and labor economics in three ways. First, I demonstrate that highly selective colleges in America's largest research university systems shifts party registration toward the political left, providing the strongest evidence to date that higher education shapes students' party preferences. This finding complicates our evaluation of the positive civic externalities of education by demonstrating that colleges can change political beliefs as well as participation (Firoozi and Geyn, 2023). Second, evidence from multiple data sources suggest an important role for peer socialization during college in the development of partisan identity, with important ramifications for generalizing these findings to other settings. Third, I show that the same types of highly selective colleges that confer higher earnings, social capital, and political clout later in life also change partisanship, which implies that the direct effects of such colleges on their students are likely to understate the total impact of colleges on the policymaking and electoral process.

I expect that my findings will generalize to highly selective colleges in other locations and higher education sectors. I draw this conclusion from (1) evidence that the association

between college selectivity and left-liberalism among students generalizes to the United States as a whole, (2) descriptive statistics showing UC students have similar political outcomes to peers at similarly selective colleges in other settings like USC, NYU, and the University of Michigan, (3), evidence that the selectivity gradients in peer and faculty characteristics in California parallel those in the US overall, and (4) the fact that most states and countries have tiered college systems based on selectivity similar to California's "Master Plan for Higher Education" (Kerr et al., 2001b). Still, it is worth noting that there is an important limitation to this field setting; the UC's top percent policy could influence students' politics through several plausible mechanisms.

My findings offer some obvious directions for future work. While I focus on the effects of selective colleges, my estimates may differ in direction or magnitude from other forms of higher education, like graduate schools and community colleges, or from identity-specialized four-year institutions, like Catholic schools, women's colleges, or HBCUs. Another promising line of work may provide evidence on the extent to which coursework, curricula, or particular majors may have heterogeneous effects (Brocic and Miles, 2021).

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Tables

Table 1: Student Ideology and Partisanship by College Selectivity

A. Ideology of American College Seniors by Selectivity				
Mean SAT Percentile	Left	Middle	Right	Total
>90th Percentile	40.90	36.77	22.33	100.00
75th to 90th	37.51	39.09	23.40	100.00
50th to 75th	29.44	42.11	28.44	100.00
<50th Percentile	27.03	45.73	27.25	100.00
B. Ideology of Californian College Seniors by Selectivity				
Mean SAT Percentile	Left	Middle	Right	Total
>90th Percentile	44.10	38.46	17.45	100.00
75th to 90th	39.41	39.31	21.28	100.00
50th to 75th	27.85	36.11	36.04	100.00
<50th Percentile	25.40	40.55	34.06	100.00
C. Partisanship of In-Sample UC Applicants by Selectivity				
Mean SAT Percentile	Democratic	Neither	Republican	Total
>90th Percentile	60.51	32.27	7.22	100.00
75th to 90th	58.84	31.60	9.55	100.00
50th to 75th	56.97	32.89	10.14	100.00
<50th Percentile	55.56	33.20	11.24	100.00

Note: Panels A and B use data on self-reported student ideology and selectivity data from the CIRP College Senior Survey maintained by UCLA's Higher Education Research Institute. "Left" denotes liberal or far-left, "Middle" denotes middle-of-the-road, and "Right" denotes conservative or far-right. Panel C uses L2 party registration data assessed 10 to 14 years later among my in-sample UC applicants combined with college characteristics from Opportunity Insights. "Neither" denotes students who are registered voters, but do not affiliate with a major party. In all panels, "Mean SAT Percentile" reflects the percentile rank of a campus's average SAT score relative to all campuses within the national UCLA HERI sample, weighted by student population.

Table 2: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on First Stage Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
UC Applications	-0.0088	-0.0138	-0.0267	-0.0308	0.0202	0.0087
	(0.0210)	(0.0205)	(0.0198)	(0.0192)	(0.0284)	(0.0277)
UC Admissions	0.4153**	0.4043**	0.3784**	0.3749**	0.4542**	0.4425**
	(0.0277)	(0.0268)	(0.0216)	(0.0207)	(0.0309)	(0.0298)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "UC Applications" refers to the aggregate number of UC campuses to which an applicant applied. "UC Admissions" refers to the aggregate number of UC campuses to which an applicant was admitted.

Table 3: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Admission and Enrollment

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Admission Outcomes						
UC Success Rate	0.0947**	0.0940**	0.0900**	0.0899**	0.0999**	0.0991**
	(0.0050)	(0.0049)	(0.0038)	(0.0037)	(0.0054)	(0.0053)
B. Enrollment Decomposed by Sector						
UC	0.0339**	0.0332**	0.0318**	0.0309**	0.0382**	0.0391**
	(0.0075)	(0.0073)	(0.0068)	(0.0065)	(0.0098)	(0.0094)
CSU	-0.0399**	-0.0391**	-0.0289**	-0.0282**	-0.0433**	-0.0422**
	(0.0052)	(0.0051)	(0.0041)	(0.0041)	(0.0059)	(0.0058)
Other CA	0.0042	0.0038	0.0026	0.0023	0.0040	0.0032
	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0040)	(0.0039)	(0.0057)	(0.0057)
Other OOS	0.0162**	0.0148**	0.0086*	0.0082*	0.0185**	0.0169**
	(0.0049)	(0.0048)	(0.0039)	(0.0038)	(0.0055)	(0.0054)
2 Year/No College	-0.0147**	-0.0140**	-0.0141**	-0.0132**	-0.0174**	-0.0171**
	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0036)	(0.0036)	(0.0053)	(0.0052)
C. Four Year Enrollment Decomposed by Selectivity						
Highly Selective	0.0743**	0.0739**	0.0604**	0.0588**	0.0834**	0.0816**
	(0.0085)	(0.0082)	(0.0064)	(0.0062)	(0.0093)	(0.0089)
Selective	-0.0587**	-0.0572**	-0.0463**	-0.0456**	-0.0660**	-0.0645**
	(0.0073)	(0.0071)	(0.0059)	(0.0058)	(0.0085)	(0.0083)
2 Year/No College	-0.0147**	-0.0140**	-0.0141**	-0.0132**	-0.0174**	-0.0171**
	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0036)	(0.0036)	(0.0053)	(0.0052)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). The "UC Success Rate" refers to the ratio between the number of UC campuses an individual applied to and the number of UC campuses to which they were actually admitted. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges. "Highly Selective" refers to four year colleges classified by Opportunity Insights ratings as Highly Selective, Elite, or Ivy Plus. "Selective" refers to four year colleges classified by Opportunity Insights ratings as Selective or a lower catgeory of selectivity.

Table 4: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Quality and Selectivity

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Instr. Spending	2646.47**	2594.58**	2496.89**	2456.31**	2962.02**	2898.69**
	(235.59)	(228.96)	(184.78)	(178.38)	(263.99)	(257.02)
Rejection Rate	0.0395**	0.0388**	0.0378**	0.0371**	0.0445**	0.0435**
	(0.0041)	(0.0040)	(0.0032)	(0.0031)	(0.0046)	(0.0044)
Graduation Rate	0.0311**	0.0305**	0.0290**	0.0281**	0.0367**	0.0359**
	(0.0040)	(0.0039)	(0.0032)	(0.0030)	(0.0046)	(0.0044)
Median Income	1997.58**	1958.35**	1765.27**	1743.78**	2242.71**	2187.53**
	(176.18)	(169.12)	(136.62)	(130.32)	(197.44)	(189.78)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "Instr. Spending" refers to average per student instructional expenditures. "Rejection Rate" refers to the fraction of applicants to a particular campus who were rejected. "Graduation Rate" refers to the proportion of first time full-time freshmen who enter a given campus who complete their intended degree within 150 percent of normative time to degree. "Median Income" in this context refers to the median post-enrollment earnings for students who attended a given campus. Data are from Opportunity Insights.

Table 5: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Total Voter Registration Rate						
Registered to Vote	0.0118	0.0110	0.0127^{+}	0.0119^{+}	0.0158	0.0148
	(0.0078)	(0.0078)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0102)	(0.0101)
B. Political Party Membership						
Republican Party	-0.0060^{+}	-0.0061^{+}	-0.0061*	-0.0063*	-0.0089*	-0.0091*
	(0.0032)	(0.0032)	(0.0029)	(0.0028)	(0.0043)	(0.0043)
Democrat/Independent	0.0202*	0.0197*	0.0188**	0.0182**	0.0247*	0.0239*
	(0.0080)	(0.0079)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0103)	(0.0102)
Democratic Party	0.0107	0.0103	0.0099	0.0097	0.0113	0.0110
	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0064)	(0.0063)	(0.0093)	(0.0093)
No Party Preference	0.0097^{+}	0.0094^{+}	0.0113*	0.0109*	0.0146^{+}	0.0142^{+}
	(0.0056)	(0.0056)	(0.0049)	(0.0049)	(0.0076)	(0.0076)
Third Party	-0.0025	-0.0025	-0.0024	-0.0024	-0.0013	-0.0013
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)
C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties						
Republican Convert	-0.0026**	-0.0025**	-0.0015^{+}	-0.0014^{+}	-0.0027*	-0.0026*
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)
Democratic Convert	-0.0013	-0.0014	-0.0013	-0.0013	-0.0013	-0.0014
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "Democrat/Independent" refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party.

Table 6: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Total Voter Turnout Rates						
Ever Voted	0.0088	0.0079	0.0076	0.0069	0.0140	0.0130
	(0.0077)	(0.0076)	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0101)	(0.0100)
Total Votes Cast	0.0409	0.0374	0.0532	0.0507	0.0687	0.0640
	(0.0326)	(0.0326)	(0.0339)	(0.0338)	(0.0500)	(0.0498)
B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes						
Presidential Votes	0.0257	0.0232	0.0373	0.0355	0.0468	0.0440
	(0.0220)	(0.0220)	(0.0237)	(0.0237)	(0.0348)	(0.0346)
Midterm Votes	0.0159	0.0152	0.0159	0.0152	0.0218	0.0200
	(0.0121)	(0.0121)	(0.0121)	(0.0121)	(0.0182)	(0.0181)
C. General and Primary Election Votes						
General Votes	0.0073	0.0046	0.0213	0.0197	0.0216	0.0189
	(0.0207)	(0.0206)	(0.0221)	(0.0221)	(0.0325)	(0.0323)
Primary Votes	0.0339*	0.0330*	0.0319*	0.0311*	0.0471*	0.0451*
	(0.0142)	(0.0141)	(0.0143)	(0.0143)	(0.0210)	(0.0210)
D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates						
Republican Primaries	-0.0032	-0.0034	-0.0021	-0.0024	-0.0022	-0.0025
	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0049)	(0.0049)
Democratic Primaries	0.0170*	0.0167*	0.0185*	0.0183*	0.0263*	0.0258*
	(0.0084)	(0.0083)	(0.0087)	(0.0087)	(0.0128)	(0.0128)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "Voted" refers to the extensive margin of ever having cast a ballot in a regularly scheduled federal election and "votes" refers to the aggregate number of ballots cast by an individual in a regularly scheduled federal election. Republican and Democratic primaries refer to the total ballots cast in partisan presidential primary elections.

Table 7: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Student Characteristics

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Race, Ethnicity, and Nationality						
White	-0.0090**	-0.0093**	-0.0075**	-0.0077**	-0.0092**	-0.0100**
	(0.0024)	(0.0024)	(0.0022)	(0.0021)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)
Asian	0.0150**	0.0152**	0.0110**	0.0110**	0.0173**	0.0179**
	(0.0027)	(0.0026)	(0.0022)	(0.0022)	(0.0032)	(0.0031)
Black	0.0007	0.0007	0.0008+	0.0008+	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)
Hispanic	-0.0102**	-0.0098**	-0.0062**	-0.0060**	-0.0111**	-0.0106**
	(0.0012)	(0.0012)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)
International	0.0024**	0.0023**	0.0020**	0.0020**	0.0027**	0.0026**
	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
B. Peer Family Income						
Median Income	2958.64**	2830.96**	2708.18**	2653.35**	3516.16**	3324.75**
	(379.12)	(356.97)	(329.26)	(307.64)	(468.53)	(444.65)
Bottom 80 Percent	-0.0133**	-0.0127**	-0.0121**	-0.0118**	-0.0161**	-0.0152**
	(0.0017)	(0.0016)	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0021)	(0.0020)
Top 5 Percent	0.0134**	0.0128**	0.0120**	0.0118**	0.0151**	0.0143**
	(0.0014)	(0.0013)	(0.0012)	(0.0011)	(0.0017)	(0.0016)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "Median Income" in this context refers to the median family income of peers at a given campus. "Bottom 80 Percent" and "Top 5 Percent" refer to the fraction of students at a given campus who hail from families within a given range of the household income distribution within the United States. Data are from Opportunity Insights.

Table 8: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Peer Ideology

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Self-Reported Freshman Ideology						
Far-Right Peers	-0.0003**	-0.0003**	-0.0003**	-0.0003**	-0.0004**	-0.0004**
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Conservative Peers	-0.0007	-0.0007	-0.0008+	-0.0008+	-0.0007	-0.0008
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)
Moderate Peers	-0.0035**	-0.0034**	-0.0030**	-0.0029**	-0.0041**	-0.0040**
	(0.0005)	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0006)	(0.0005)
Liberal Peers	0.0045**	0.0045**	0.0040**	0.0039**	0.0050**	0.0050**
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Far-Left Peers	0.0001+	0.0001+	0.0001	0.0001	0.0001*	0.0001*
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
B. GOP Share of Institution's Graduates						
GOP Graduate Share	-0.0053**	-0.0053**	-0.0051**	-0.0051**	-0.0058**	-0.0057**
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "GOP Share" refers to the share of registered voters from my sample who attended a given institution that are a member of the Republican Party in 2021. Data on other outcomes are imputed from UCLA's HERI surveys using the method described in Section 5.

Table 9: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Peer Religion

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Self-Reported Freshman Religion						
Protestant Peers	-0.0030**	-0.0030**	-0.0028**	-0.0028**	-0.0031**	-0.0032**
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0010)	(0.0010)
Catholic Peers	-0.0037**	-0.0036**	-0.0035**	-0.0033**	-0.0043**	-0.0043**
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Jewish Peers	0.0022**	0.0021**	0.0017**	0.0016**	0.0023**	0.0023**
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
Other Peers	0.0013**	0.0013**	0.0013**	0.0013**	0.0014**	0.0015**
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
No Religion Peers	0.0034**	0.0034**	0.0033**	0.0032**	0.0037**	0.0038**
	(0.0008)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0010)	(0.0010)
B. Aggregate Self-Reported Christians						
Christian Peers	-0.0067**	-0.0065**	-0.0063**	-0.0061**	-0.0074**	-0.0075**
	(0.0013)	(0.0012)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)	(0.0016)	(0.0016)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "Christian Peers" is a simple aggregation of the share of peers who self identify as Catholic or Protestant. Data are imputed from UCLA's HERI surveys using the method described in Section 5.

Table 10: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Enrollment by Imputed Faculty Ideology

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Self-Reported Faculty Ideology						
Far-Right Faculty	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Conservative Faculty	-0.0041**	-0.0041**	-0.0037**	-0.0037**	-0.0047**	-0.0047**
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)
Moderate Faculty	-0.0023**	-0.0023**	-0.0019**	-0.0019**	-0.0026**	-0.0026**
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0005)	(0.0005)
Liberal Faculty	0.0048**	0.0048**	0.0043**	0.0043**	0.0057**	0.0057**
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0006)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)
Far-Left Faculty	0.0014**	0.0014**	0.0013**	0.0013**	0.0017**	0.0017**
	(0.0003)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)
B. Aggregate Left-Liberal Faculty						
Left-Liberal Faculty	0.0063**	0.0062**	0.0056**	0.0056**	0.0073**	0.0074**
	(0.0010)	(0.0010)	(0.0009)	(0.0009)	(0.0013)	(0.0012)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020)."Left-Liberal Faculty" is a simple aggregation of the share of faculty who self-identify as liberal or far-left. Data are imputed from UCLA's HERI surveys using the method described in Section 5.

Table 11: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Neighborhood Choice

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Census Block Characteristics						
Median Education	0.0357	0.0383	-0.0089	0.0032	0.0954*	0.0849*
	(0.0338)	(0.0288)	(0.0297)	(0.0250)	(0.0421)	(0.0355)
Median Income	157.37	238.73	-1153.84	-707.23	2152.43	1716.09
	(1185.33)	(1036.12)	(1041.79)	(902.27)	(1510.39)	(1317.17)
B. Local Partisanship						
Republican Neighbors	0.0002	0.0006	0.0003	0.0006	-0.0019	-0.0015
	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0031)	(0.0030)
Democratic Neigbhors	0.0009	0.0007	0.0004	0.0001	0.0019	0.0018
	(0.0022)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0031)	(0.0031)
No Party Neighbors	0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0007	-0.0008	0.0008	0.0005
	(0.0009)	(0.0009)	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0011)	(0.0011)
Third Party Neighbors	-0.0005	-0.0005	0.0001	0.0000	-0.0009*	-0.0008*
	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0003)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies	Varies

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "Median Education" refers to the median years of schooling within a Californian registrant's census block. "Median Income" refers to the estimated median household income within a Californian registrant's census block. "Neighbors" refer to the respective proportion of registered voters with a given party registration status within a Californian registrant's local area. Data are from L2's VM2 California voter file.

Figures



Figure 1: RD Graph of UC Applications and Admissions

Note: Gray dots reflect the number of UC applications per student. Black dots reflect the number of UC admissions per student. Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort.



Figure 2: RD Graphs of College Enrollment

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 3.



Figure 3: RD Graphs of College Quality

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 4.



Figure 4: RD Graphs of Voter Registration Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 5.



Figure 5: RD Graphs of Voter Participation Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 6.



Figure 6: RD Graphs of Peer Characteristics

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 7.



Figure 7: RD Graphs of Imputed Peer Ideology

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 8.



Figure 8: RD Graphs of Imputed Peer Religion

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 9.



Figure 9: RD Graphs of Imputed Faculty Ideology

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 10.



Figure 10: RD Graphs of Neighborhood Characteristics

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Outcomes correspond directly to those in Table 11.

Online Appendices

A In-Sample Survey Appendix

A.1 Survey Descriptive Statistics



Figure A.1: Poll Respondent Ideologies and Two-Party Preference

Note: The two ideological indexes in this figure are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. Each dot reflects a point in the two-dimensional ideology space. The darker the color of a dot, the more individuals are located at that particular point. The color gradient from blue to red reflects the proportion of individuals at a given point who say they favor the Democratic Party over the Republican Party on policy issues, with blue dots corresponding to the Democratic Party and red dots corresponding to the Republican Party. Plugging in the median response for each question from Pew Research samples of American voters yields a score of (0,0).



Figure A.2: Mean Respondent Ideology by Voter Registration Status

Note: The two ideological indexes in this figure are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. Each dot reflects the average ideological scores of a particular voter registration group from in-sample respondents in the two-dimensional ideology space. The dots are sized roughly based on the number of respondents within the particular voter registration group. Plugging in the median response for each question from Pew Research samples of American voters yields a score of (0,0).

Table A.1: Comparison of Survey Takers and Full Sample

Demographics	Respondents	Full Sample
Female	52.2%	52.8%
Underrepresented Minority	25.2%	24.4%
Likely Cal Grant Eligible	38.1%	34.0%
First Generation Student	45.2%	45.1%
FAFSA Filer	68.9%	63.7%
Student Works Pre-College	5.1%	4.7%
Low Enrollment County	5.3%	5.6%
Low Quality High School	14.2%	14.1%
Raised by Single Parent	17.1%	15.6%
Dad's Years of Schooling	14.2 years	14.3 years
Mom's Years of Schooling	14.0 years	14.0 years
ISIR Family Income	$77,594	$81,476
Reported Family Income	$88,413	$93,056
High School GPA	3.61	3.59
Household Size	3.95	4.04
Party Registration	Respondents	Full Sample
No Registration	45.3%	48.9%
Democratic	32.1%	29.5%
No Party	15.6%	14.8%
Republican	4.8%	4.8%
Third Party	2.0%	1.7%
College Sector	Respondents	Full Sample
University of California	56.7%	52.8%
California Sate University	15.2%	15.1%
California Private	7.1%	7.2%
Out-of-State	8.0%	9.2%
2-yr or No College	12.7%	15.3%

Note: The column titled "Respondents" reflects the mean value or percentage among people who participated in my proprietary survey, which was sent to all in-sample UC applicants. The column titled "Full Sample" shows the corresponding value for all UC applicants within my sample, regardless of whether or not they participated in the survey.

Table A.2: Two-Party Policy Preference by Party Registration

	Two-Party Preference		
Registration Status	Republican	Democratic	Total %
Democratic	6.2	93.8	100.0
Non-Partisan	26.6	73.4	100.0
Not Registered	25.7	74.3	100.0
Other	21.7	78.3	100.0
Republican	77.4	22.6	100.0
N	243	862	1,105

Note: The Democratic and Republican columns reflect the proportion of survey respondents with a given voter registration status who say they favor a given major political party on policy issues. "Non-partisan" refers to individuals who are registered to vote, but are unaffiliated with a political party. "Other" refers to individuals who are registered members of third parties.

Table A.3: Ideology Scores by Party Registration

	Mean Ideology	
Registration Status	Economic	Social
Democratic	-0.595	-0.638
Non-Partisan	-0.329	-0.434
Not Registered	-0.399	-0.458
Other	-0.333	-0.536
Republican	0.192	-0.022

Note: The economic and social columns reflect the mean ideological score or survey respondents with a given voter registration status. The two ideological indexes are calculated using the questions in Block 3 of the Survey in Section A.2. Index values are calculated as the average policy view on a particular set of questions with the most liberal response assigned -1, the most conservative response assigned +1, and all other responses interpolated at equidistant points. "Non-partisan" refers to individuals who are registered to vote, but are unaffiliated with a political party. "Other" refers to individuals who are registered members of third parties.

Table A.4: Self-Reported Political Influence Ratings

	Mean Influence Score			
College Enrollment	Family	Friends	Coworkers	Educators
UC	1.91	1.86	3.46	2.77
CSU	1.66	1.96	3.57	2.80
Other CA	1.80	2.03	3.41	2.77
Other OOS	1.72	1.98	3.56	2.74
No 4 Yr	1.86	2.01	3.49	2.64
Total	1.84	1.92	3.48	2.75

Note: Each column reflects the mean self-reported influence rank respondents assign to a particular group. The most influential group is assigned the value 1, the second most influential is assigned the value 2, the third is assigned 3, and the least influential is assigned the value 4. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.5: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions with Family

	Discusses Current Events with Family				
College Enrollment	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	11.2	9.1	32.4	47.4	100.0
CSU	8.9	7.7	34.3	49.1	100.0
Other CA	11.4	5.1	32.9	50.6	100.0
Other OOS	9.0	5.6	32.6	52.8	100.0
No 4 Yr	9.2	2.8	29.8	58.2	100.0
Total	10.4	7.5	32.4	49.7	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.6: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions in College

	Discussed Current Events in College				
College Enrollment	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	16.4	4.8	26.5	52.3	100.0
CSU	15.4	7.7	26.6	50.3	100.0
Other CA	13.9	2.5	25.3	58.2	100.0
Other OOS	13.5	4.5	14.6	67.4	100.0
No 4 Yr	15.6	5.0	19.9	59.6	100.0
Total	15.7	5.1	24.6	54.6	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.7: Self-Reported Current Events Discussions with Friends

	Discusses Current Events with Friends				
College Enrollment	Rarely	Yearly	Monthly	Weekly	Total
UC	4.3	4.6	29.2	61.9	100.0
CSU	7.1	2.4	34.9	55.6	100.0
Other CA	1.3	10.1	29.1	59.5	100.0
Other OOS	6.7	0.0	29.2	64.0	100.0
No 4 Yr	7.1	3.5	30.5	58.9	100.0
Total	5.1	4.2	30.2	60.5	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they discussed current events with the stated frequency. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.8: Self-Reported College Student Housing

	Ever Lived with Students		
College Enrollment	Yes	No	Total
UC	82.8	17.2	100.0
CSU	57.4	42.6	100.0
Other CA	84.8	15.2	100.0
Other OOS	88.8	11.2	100.0
No 4 Yr	58.2	41.8	100.0
Total	76.4	23.6	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who say they have or have not ever lived in on-campus student housing or in a housing complex mostly composed of college students. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.9: Self-Reported Pereptions of Friend Ideology

	Perceived Friend Ideology			
College Enrollment	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Total
UC	63.2	31.1	5.7	100.0
CSU	54.4	36.7	8.9	100.0
Other CA	64.6	30.4	5.1	100.0
Other OOS	64.0	31.5	4.5	100.0
No 4 Yr	56.0	36.9	7.1	100.0
Total	61.1	32.7	6.2	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their friends. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.10: Self-Reported Pereptions of Coworker Ideology

	Perceived Coworker Ideology			
College Enrollment	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Total
UC	38.3	47.7	14.0	100.0
CSU	33.1	47.9	18.9	100.0
Other CA	40.5	39.2	20.3	100.0
Other OOS	41.6	46.1	12.4	100.0
No 4 Yr	42.6	48.2	9.2	100.0
Total	38.5	47.1	14.5	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their coworkers. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

Table A.11: Self-Reported Pereptions of Educator Ideology

	Perceived Educator Ideology			
College Enrollment	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative	Total
UC	57.6	38.9	3.5	100.0
CSU	55.0	37.3	7.7	100.0
Other CA	50.6	44.3	5.1	100.0
Other OOS	51.7	42.7	5.6	100.0
No 4 Yr	56.0	38.3	5.7	100.0
Total	56.0	39.3	4.7	100.0

Note: Each column reflects the percent of respondents who would use the respective ideological label to characterize their professors or teachers. Responses are sort into rows by the college enrollment category of an individual in the fall term following their application to the UC system. "Other OOS" refers to out-of-state four year colleges.

A.2 Survey Questions

Survey Block 1

Question 1. Indicate how often you have: (Select one option in each row)

	Rarely	**Yearly**	**Monthly**	**Weekly**
Discussed current events with friends				
Discussed current events with family				
Discussed current events during college				
Demonstrated or volunteered for a cause				
Attended religious services				

Question 2. Rank the following groups of people based on how big of an impact you feel they had on your political views. (Drag and drop to move them. 1 means largest impact, 4 means smallest impact.)
Your Professors or Teachers
Your Friends
Your Family
Your Coworkers

Question 3. At roughly what age would you say that you developed most of your social and economic views?
Before age 18
Ages 18 to 21
Ages 21 to 24
Ages 24 to 30
After age 30

Question 4. Have you ever lived in an on-campus college dormitory or in a housing complex mostly composed of college students?
Yes
No

Question 5. If you had to choose, which party is more closely aligned with your policy views?
the Republican Party
the Democratic Party

Survey Block 2

Question 6. Compared to other Americans, would you say that members of {Unselected choice from Question 5} are more, about the same, or less... (Select one option in each row)

	More	**About the Same**	**Less**
Moral			
Open-minded			
Intelligent			

Question 7. To the best of your knowledge, which the following claims are true and which are false? (Select one option in each row)

	True	**False**
COVID killed over 5 times as many Americans as the flu and pneumonia last year.		
Over 95% of climate scientists agree that humans are causing global warming and climate change.		
The violent crime and murder rates were lower last year than 30 years ago.		
More than 75% of immigrants currently in the US are living in the country legally.		
Over 90% of expert economists believe gas price changes are predominantly due to market forces, not government policy.		

Question 8. Which of the following best describes the beliefs of... (Select one option in each row)

	Liberal	**Moderate**	**Conservative**
Your Family			
Your Friends			
Your Coworkers			
Your Professors or Teachers			
Yourself			

Survey Block 3

Question 9. Which of the following statements comes closest to your overall view of gun laws in the United States?

Gun laws should be MORE strict than they are today

Gun laws are about right

Gun laws should be LESS strict than they are today

Question 10. Do you think abortion should be...?

Legal in all cases, no exceptions

Legal in most cases, some exceptions

Illegal in most cases, some exceptions

Illegal in all cases, no exceptions

Question 11. When it comes to transgender people which statement comes closest to your views, even if neither is exactly right?

Someone's gender can be different from the sex they were assigned at birth

Someone's gender is determined by the sex they were assigned at birth

Question 12. Which comes closest to your views about what needs to be done to ensure equal rights for all Americans regardless of their racial or ethnic backgrounds, even if none are exactly right?

Most U.S. laws and major institutions need to be completely rebuilt because they are fundamentally biased against some racial and ethnic groups

While there are many inequities in U.S. laws and institutions, necessary changes can be made by working within the current systems

Little needs to be done

Nothing at all needs to be done

Question 13. Should LEGAL immigration into the United States be...?

Increased

Kept at present level

Decreased

Question 14. Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for people convicted of murder?

Strongly Favor

Somewhat Favor

Somewhat Oppose

Strongly Oppose

Question 15. Thinking about the assistance government provides to people in need, do you think the government...?
Should provide MORE assistance
Is providing about the right amount of assistance
Should provide LESS assistance

Question 16. Thinking about the country's energy supply, do you think the US should...?
Phase out the use of fossil fuels completely, relying instead on renewable sources only
Use a mix of energy sources including fossil fuels along with renewable energy sources

Question 17. Would you favor or oppose making tuition at public colleges and universities free for all American students?
Strongly Favor
Somewhat Favor
Somewhat Oppose
Strongly Oppose

Question 18. Do you think it is the responsibility of the federal government to make sure all Americans have health care coverage?
Yes, it should be provided through a single national health insurance system run by the government
Yes, it should be provided through a mix of private insurance companies and government programs
No, but government should continue programs like Medicare and Medicaid for seniors and the very poor
No, government should not be involved in providing health insurance at all

Question 19. Would you favor or oppose raising the federal minimum wage to $15.00 an hour?
Strongly Favor
Somewhat Favor
Somewhat Oppose
Strongly Oppose

Question 20. If you had to choose, would you rather have a smaller government providing fewer services, or a bigger government providing more services?
Bigger government, more services
Smaller government, fewer services

B IV Estimates Appendix

Table B.1: IV Estimates of Effects on Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Total Voter Registration Rate						
Registered to Vote	0.0113	0.0092	0.0336^{+}	0.0317^{+}	0.0347	0.0335
	(0.0166)	(0.0170)	(0.0184)	(0.0185)	(0.0225)	(0.0229)
B. Political Party Membership						
Republican Party	-0.0129^{+}	-0.0139*	-0.0162*	-0.0169*	-0.0196*	-0.0206*
	(0.0069)	(0.0070)	(0.0075)	(0.0076)	(0.0095)	(0.0097)
Democrat/Independent	0.0349*	0.0334^{+}	0.0498**	0.0486**	0.0543*	0.0541*
	(0.0173)	(0.0175)	(0.0184)	(0.0185)	(0.0228)	(0.0233)
Democratic Party	0.0117	0.0113	0.0263	0.0259	0.0249	0.0249
	(0.0154)	(0.0156)	(0.0167)	(0.0168)	(0.0206)	(0.0210)
No Party Preference	0.0218^{+}	0.0210^{+}	0.0300*	0.0292*	0.0322^{+}	0.0321^{+}
	(0.0120)	(0.0123)	(0.0130)	(0.0132)	(0.0168)	(0.0172)
Third Party	-0.0067	-0.0067	-0.0065	-0.0065	-0.0029	-0.0029
	(0.0040)	(0.0041)	(0.0042)	(0.0043)	(0.0053)	(0.0054)
C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties						
Republican Convert	-0.0018	-0.0016	-0.0038^{+}	-0.0038^{+}	-0.0059*	-0.0060*
	(0.0018)	(0.0018)	(0.0021)	(0.0021)	(0.0028)	(0.0028)
Democratic Convert	-0.0025	-0.0028	-0.0033	-0.0036	-0.0029	-0.0032
	(0.0033)	(0.0033)	(0.0037)	(0.0037)	(0.0044)	(0.0045)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "Democrat/Independent" refers to the fraction of students who are registered as Democrat, as a no party preference voter, or as a member of a third party. Democratic and Republican converts are voters who are currently registered with the Democratic and Republican Party in California, but at any time in the past were a registered member of the other major party. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the number of UC campuses to which an individual was admitted.

Table B.2: IV Estimates of Effects on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
A. Total Voter Turnout Rates						
Ever Voted	0.0056	0.0036	0.0202	0.0184	0.0307	0.0294
	(0.0162)	(0.0165)	(0.0182)	(0.0183)	(0.0222)	(0.0227)
Total Votes Cast	0.0995	0.0951	0.1406	0.1353	0.1512	0.1446
	(0.0764)	(0.0782)	(0.0896)	(0.0903)	(0.1104)	(0.1128)
B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes						
Presidential Votes	0.0642	0.0603	0.0985	0.0947	0.1031	0.0994
	(0.0541)	(0.0554)	(0.0626)	(0.0632)	(0.0767)	(0.0783)
Midterm Votes	0.0358	0.0328	0.0420	0.0406	0.0480	0.0452
	(0.0283)	(0.0289)	(0.0320)	(0.0322)	(0.0401)	(0.0410)
C. General and Primary Election Votes						
General Votes	0.0324	0.0280	0.0564	0.0525	0.0475	0.0427
	(0.0519)	(0.0530)	(0.0584)	(0.0589)	(0.0715)	(0.0729)
Primary Votes	0.0807*	0.0790*	0.0842*	0.0828*	0.1036*	0.1018*
	(0.0338)	(0.0345)	(0.0378)	(0.0381)	(0.0468)	(0.0479)
D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates						
Republican Primaries	-0.0054	-0.0064	-0.0057	-0.0064	-0.0048	-0.0057
	(0.0084)	(0.0085)	(0.0088)	(0.0089)	(0.0107)	(0.0110)
Democratic Primaries	0.0434*	0.0436*	0.0488*	0.0489*	0.0580*	0.0584*
	(0.0213)	(0.0217)	(0.0231)	(0.0232)	(0.0284)	(0.0290)
Bandwidth	Optimal	Optimal	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Sample Size	Varies	Varies	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). "Voted" refers to the extensive margin of ever having cast a ballot in a regularly scheduled federal election and "votes" refers to the aggregate number of ballots cast by an individual in a regularly scheduled federal election. Republican and Democratic primaries refer to the total ballots cast in partisan presidential primary elections. Crossing the 96th percentile threshold is used as the excluded instrument for the number of UC campuses to which an individual was admitted.

C RD Validation Appendix



Figure C.1: McCrary Test

Note: This figure displays density of observations across the reweighted GPA normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within a high school cohort.

Table C.1: Balance Checks for Predicted Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Total Voter Registration Rate			
Predicted Voter Registration	0.0008	0.0008	0.0006
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0012)
B. Political Party Membership			
Predicted Republican	0.0002	0.0001	0.0001
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)
Predicted Dem/Ind	0.0008	0.0006	0.0004
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0010)
Predicted Democrat	0.0003	0.0003	0.0002
	(0.0006)	(0.0006)	(0.0009)
Predicted No Party	0.0004	0.0003	0.0003
	(0.0004)	(0.0005)	(0.0007)
Predicted Third Party	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0000
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
C. Midlife Conversion Between Major Parties			
Predicted Republican Conversion	-0.0000	-0.0000	-0.0001^{+}
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0000)
Predicted Democrat Conversion	0.0000	0.0000	0.0001
	(0.0000)	(0.0000)	(0.0001)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 3.

Table C.2: Balance Checks for Predicted Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
A. Total Voter Turnout Rates			
Predicted Voter	0.0010	0.0007	0.0006
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0012)
Predicted Votes Cast	0.0027	0.0019	0.0023
	(0.0041)	(0.0043)	(0.0062)
B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes			
Predicted Regular Votes	0.0017	0.0013	0.0012
	(0.0028)	(0.0030)	(0.0043)
Predicted Midterm Votes	0.0007	0.0005	0.0011
	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0019)
C. General and Primary Election Votes			
Predicted General Votes	0.0016	0.0011	0.0012
	(0.0027)	(0.0028)	(0.0040)
Predicted Primary Votes	0.0011	0.0007	0.0012
	(0.0014)	(0.0015)	(0.0022)
D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates			
Predicted Republican Primary Votes	0.0002	0.0002	0.0003
	(0.0002)	(0.0002)	(0.0003)
Predicted Democratic Primary Votes	0.0002	0.0002	0.0002
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0012)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 3.

Table C.3: Balance Checks for Predicted Partisanship (Conditional on Registration)

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Predicted Republican	0.0001	0.0001	0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Predicted Dem/Ind	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0002
	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0005)
Predicted Democrat	-0.0001	-0.0003	-0.0004
	(0.0010)	(0.0011)	(0.0015)
Predicted No Party	0.0002	0.0002	0.0003
	(0.0007)	(0.0007)	(0.0011)
Predicted Third Party	-0.0001	-0.0001	-0.0001
	(0.0001)	(0.0001)	(0.0001)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Results correspond to those in Table C.1, but with outcomes that are predicted using partisanship conditional on registration rather than unconditional partisanship. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 3.

Table C.4: Covariate Balance Checks

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Female	0.0024	-0.0012	0.0028
	(0.0070)	(0.0067)	(0.0099)
URM	-0.0066	-0.0045	-0.0103
	(0.0053)	(0.0056)	(0.0083)
Cal Grant	-0.0041	-0.0030	-0.0093
	(0.0066)	(0.0066)	(0.0095)
First Generation	-0.0039	-0.0022	-0.0101
	(0.0070)	(0.0067)	(0.0095)
Dad's Schooling	0.0760^{+}	0.0541	0.1105^{+}
	(0.0403)	(0.0418)	(0.0594)
Mom's Schooling	0.0202	0.0202	0.0722
	(0.0408)	(0.0408)	(0.0574)
Dad's Info Missing	0.0024	0.0038	-0.0016
	(0.0037)	(0.0039)	(0.0058)
Mom's Info Missing	-0.0022	-0.0020	-0.0042
	(0.0030)	(0.0033)	(0.0049)
FAFSA Filed	0.0016	0.0021	-0.0053
	(0.0057)	(0.0061)	(0.0089)
Application Year	0.0127	0.0190	0.0300
	(0.0177)	(0.0185)	(0.0240)
ISIR Income	1128.7592	826.7595	2124.8770
	(1065.6962)	(1090.0484)	(1597.6353)
ISIR Missing	-0.0035	-0.0043	0.0037
	(0.0058)	(0.0062)	(0.0090)
Self-Reported Income	986.2342	666.3863	809.9436
	(1219.9420)	(1159.4477)	(1651.7142)
No Income Self-Report	-0.0002	-0.0011	0.0073
	(0.0047)	(0.0051)	(0.0076)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020).

Table C.5: Covariate Balance Checks

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)
Household Size	-0.0110	-0.0063	-0.0145
	(0.0121)	(0.0130)	(0.0193)
Low Quality HS	-0.0011	-0.0011	0.0025
	(0.0050)	(0.0048)	(0.0063)
Low Enrollment County	-0.0000	0.0004	-0.0027
	(0.0030)	(0.0031)	(0.0040)
Student Worker	0.0003	0.0001	-0.0012
	(0.0013)	(0.0013)	(0.0018)
Bandwidth	Optimal	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2
Sample Size	Varies	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020).



Figure C.2: RD Graph of Predicted Voter Registration Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 3.



Figure C.3: RD Graph of Predicted Voter Turnout Outcomes

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 3.



Figure C.4: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort.



Figure C.5: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort.



Figure C.6: Covariate RD Graphs

Note: Reweighted GPA values are normalized to the 96th percentile cutoff within an individual's high school cohort..



Figure C.7: Predicted Outcome Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given predicted outcome using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 3.



Figure C.8: Predicted Outcome Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given predicted outcome using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth. Predicted outcomes are generated using the pre-treatment covariates listed in Section 3.



Figure C.9: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.



Figure C.10: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.



Figure C.11: Covariate Bandwidth Graphs

Note: Each graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the discontinuity at the threshold in a given covariate using a local linear specification at a respective bandwidth.

D Robustness Test Appendix

Table D.1: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Registration Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Total Voter Registration Rate				
Registered to Vote	0.0126^{+}	0.0124^{+}	0.0135	0.0138
	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0103)	(0.0102)
B. Political Party Membership				
Republican Party	-0.0063*	-0.0063*	-0.0084^{+}	-0.0083^{+}
	(0.0029)	(0.0029)	(0.0043)	(0.0043)
Democrat/Independent	0.0189**	0.0188**	0.0219*	0.0220*
	(0.0070)	(0.0070)	(0.0103)	(0.0103)
Democratic Party	0.0099	0.0098	0.0118	0.0116
	(0.0064)	(0.0064)	(0.0094)	(0.0094)
No Party Preference	0.0108*	0.0108*	0.0108	0.0112
	(0.0050)	(0.0050)	(0.0077)	(0.0076)
Third Party	-0.0018	-0.0018	-0.0007	-0.0008
	(0.0016)	(0.0016)	(0.0024)	(0.0024)
C. Early Life Conversion between Major Parties				
Republican Convert	-0.0010	-0.0011	-0.0023^{+}	-0.0024*
	(0.0008)	(0.0008)	(0.0012)	(0.0012)
Democratic Convert	-0.0015	-0.0015	-0.0016	-0.0015
	(0.0014)	(0.0014)	(0.0020)	(0.0020)
Bandwidth	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
HS-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Size	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). These outcomes correspond to those in Table 5.

Table D.2: Effects on Party Registration with Bias-Corrected CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
Voter Registration		
RD_Estimate	0.0140 (0.0085)	0.0131 (0.0084)
Robust 95% CI	[-.003 ; .036]	[-.004 ; .035]
Robust p-value	0.096	0.113
Republican Party		
RD_Estimate	-0.0082* (0.0034)	-0.0083* (0.0034)
Robust 95% CI	[-.017 ; -.001]	[-.017 ; -.002]
Robust p-value	0.021	0.018
Democrat/Independent		
RD_Estimate	0.0228** (0.0088)	0.0222* (0.0087)
Robust 95% CI	[.005 ; .046]	[.005 ; .045]
Robust p-value	0.015	0.017
Democratic Party		
RD_Estimate	0.0099 (0.0077)	0.0098 (0.0077)
Robust 95% CI	[-.006 ; .03]	[-.006 ; .03]
Robust p-value	0.180	0.181
No Party Preference		
RD_Estimate	0.0138* (0.0061)	0.0133* (0.0061)
Robust 95% CI	[.002 ; .03]	[.001 ; .029]
Robust p-value	0.027	0.032
Third Party		
RD_Estimate	-0.0019 (0.0017)	-0.0019 (0.0018)
Robust 95% CI	[-.006 ; .002]	[-.006 ; .002]
Robust p-value	0.369	0.385
Republican Convert		
RD_Estimate	-0.0026* (0.0011)	-0.0026* (0.0011)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; -.001]	[-.005 ; -.001]
Robust p-value	0.015	0.017
Democratic Convert		
RD_Estimate	-0.0013 (0.0015)	-0.0014 (0.0015)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; .002]	[-.005 ; .002]
Robust p-value	0.432	0.404
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	MSE-Optimal
Polynomial	1	1
Covariates	No	Yes

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Each row titled "RD Estimate" shows the conventional point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable. These are calculated using a triangular kernel at the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). The rows "Robust 95% CI" and "Robust p-value" show the bias-corrected confidence interval and the bias-corrected p-value for the same outcome variable (Calonico et al., 2014). These outcomes correspond to those in Table 5.

Table D.3: Effects on Party Registration with Honest CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
Voter Registration		
RD Estimate	0.0140 (0.0075)	0.0139 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0022; .0284]	[-.0025; .0303]
Robust 90% CI	[.0001; .0278]	[.0000; .0277]
Republican Party		
RD Estimate	-0.0076 (0.0032)	-0.0072 (0.0030)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0147; -.0005]	[-.0143; -.0001]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0136; -.0017]	[-.0132; -.0011]
Democrat/Independent		
RD Estimate	0.0213 (0.0076)	0.0211 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[.0049; .0378]	[.0046; .0376]
Robust 90% CI	[.0074; .0352]	[.0072; .0350]
Democratic Party		
RD Estimate	0.0101 (0.0068)	0.0105 (0.0069)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0044; .0248]	[-.0042; .0252]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0021; .0225]	[-.0019; .0229]
No Party Preference		
RD Estimate	0.0128 (0.0055)	0.0126 (0.0054)
Robust 95% CI	[.0009; .0247]	[.0008; .0245]
Robust 90% CI	[.0028; .0228]	[.0026; .0226]
Third Party		
RD Estimate	-0.0013 (0.0020)	-0.0020 (0.0017)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0058; .0032]	[-.0069; .0029]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0051; .0025]	[-.0062; .0023]
Republican Convert		
RD Estimate	-0.0024 (0.0010)	-0.0019 (0.0009)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0046; -.0002]	[-.0042; .0004]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0043; -.0006]	[-.0038; .0000]
Democratic Convert		
RD Estimate	-0.0012 (0.0015)	-0.0013 (0.0015)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0046; .0020]	[-.0046; .0020]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0040; .0015]	[-.0040; .0015]
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	0.3
Polynomial	1	1

Note: Each row titled "RD Estimate" shows the point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable using a triangular kernel and the bounded seconded derivative method (Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). The rows "Robust 95% CI" and "Robust 90% CI" show the honest confidence intervals for the same outcome variable. These outcomes correspond to those in Table 5.

Table D.4: Effects on Voter Turnout with Bias-Corrected CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
Ever Voted		
RD_Estimate	0.0106 (0.0084)	0.0098 (0.0084)
Robust 95% CI	[-.005 ; .033]	[-.006 ; .032]
Robust p-value	0.160	0.183
Total Votes Cast		
RD_Estimate	0.0584 (0.0368)	0.0544 (0.0362)
Robust 95% CI	[-.023 ; .149]	[-.026 ; .143]
Robust p-value	0.151	0.177
Presidential Votes		
RD_Estimate	0.0372 (0.0246)	0.0336 (0.0240)
Robust 95% CI	[-.019 ; .096]	[-.021 ; .091]
Robust p-value	0.185	0.219
Midterm Votes		
RD_Estimate	0.0184 (0.0136)	0.0170 (0.0134)
Robust 95% CI	[-.012 ; .052]	[-.013 ; .05]
Robust p-value	0.224	0.254
General Votes		
RD_Estimate	0.0197 (0.0232)	0.0163 (0.0227)
Robust 95% CI	[-.036 ; .073]	[-.038 ; .067]
Robust p-value	0.503	0.593
Primary Votes		
RD_Estimate	0.0382* (0.0158)	0.0365* (0.0156)
Robust 95% CI	[.005 ; .078]	[.004 ; .076]
Robust p-value	0.027	0.031
Republican Primary Votes		
RD_Estimate	-0.0020 (0.0037)	-0.0023 (0.0037)
Robust 95% CI	[-.011 ; .006]	[-.012 ; .005]
Robust p-value	0.544	0.486
Democratic Primary Votes		
RD_Estimate	0.0206* (0.0092)	0.0202* (0.0091)
Robust 95% CI	[.002 ; .044]	[.002 ; .043]
Robust p-value	0.033	0.034
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	MSE-Optimal
Polynomial	1	1
Covariates	No	Yes

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Each row titled "RD Estimate" shows the conventional point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable. These are calculated using a triangular kernel at the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). The rows "Robust 95% CI" and "Robust p-value" show the bias-corrected confidence interval and the bias-corrected p-value for the same outcome variable (Calonico et al., 2014). These outcomes correspond to those in Table 6.

Table D.5: Effects on Voter Turnout with Honest CIs

Outcome	(1)	(2)
Ever Voted		
RD Estimate	0.0104 (0.0076)	0.0100 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0061; .0269]	[-.0064; .0265]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0035; .0243]	[-.0039; .0240]
Total Votes Cast		
RD Estimate	0.0582 (0.0367)	0.0588 (0.0373)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0213; .1378]	[-.0210; .1386]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0088; .1253]	[-.0084; .1259]
Presidential Votes		
RD Estimate	0.0407 (0.0259)	0.0139 (0.0074)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0156; .0970]	[-.0156; .0971]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0067; .0882]	[-.0067; .0882]
Midterm Votes		
RD Estimate	0.0154 (0.0123)	0.0181 (0.0134)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0113; .0421]	[-.0094; .0455]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0071; .0379]	[-.0050; .0411]
General Votes		
RD Estimate	0.0213 (0.0245)	0.0212 (0.0243)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0319; .0745]	[-.0320; .0744]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0236; .0661]	[-.0236; .0661]
Primary Votes		
RD Estimate	0.0329 (0.0140)	0.0376 (0.0156)
Robust 95% CI	[.0028; .0631]	[.0060; .0691]
Robust 90% CI	[.0075; .0583]	[.0110; .0641]
Republican Primary Votes		
RD Estimate	-0.0020 (0.0037)	-0.0022 (0.0036)
Robust 95% CI	[-.0100; .0060]	[-.0102; .0058]
Robust 90% CI	[-.0088; .0047]	[-.0089; .0046]
Democratic Primary Votes		
RD Estimate	0.0198 (0.0088)	0.0214 (0.0096)
Robust 95% CI	[.0008; .0389]	[.0018; .0411]
Robust 90% CI	[.0038; .0359]	[.0049; .0380]
Bandwidth	MSE-Optimal	0.3
Polynomial	1	1

Note: Each row titled "RD Estimate" shows the point estimate and standard errors in parentheses for a given outcome variable using a triangular kernel and the bounded seconded derivative method (Kolesar and Rothe, 2018). The rows "Robust 95% CI" and "Robust 90% CI" show the honest confidence intervals for the same outcome variable. These outcomes correspond to those in Table 5.

Table D.6: Effects of the UC Top Percent Policy on Voter Turnout Outcomes

Outcome	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
A. Total Voter Turnout Rates				
Ever Voted	0.0073	0.0073	0.0113	0.0115
	(0.0069)	(0.0069)	(0.0102)	(0.0101)
Total Votes Cast	0.0548	0.0543	0.0637	0.0617
	(0.0342)	(0.0342)	(0.0508)	(0.0505)
B. Presidential and Midterm Election Votes				
Presidential Votes	0.0373	0.0365	0.0426	0.0407
	(0.0239)	(0.0239)	(0.0353)	(0.0351)
Midterm Votes	0.0175	0.0178	0.0211	0.0210
	(0.0122)	(0.0122)	(0.0184)	(0.0184)
C. General and Primary Election Votes				
General Votes	0.0226	0.0222	0.0171	0.0161
	(0.0223)	(0.0223)	(0.0329)	(0.0327)
Primary Votes	0.0322*	0.0320*	0.0466*	0.0456*
	(0.0144)	(0.0144)	(0.0214)	(0.0213)
D. Partisan Primary Turnout Rates				
Republican Primaries	-0.0022	-0.0021	-0.0020	-0.0019
	(0.0034)	(0.0034)	(0.0049)	(0.0049)
Democratic Primaries	0.0189*	0.0187*	0.0293*	0.0284*
	(0.0088)	(0.0088)	(0.0130)	(0.0130)
Bandwidth	0.3	0.3	0.3	0.3
Polynomial	1	1	2	2
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
HS-Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Sample Size	78,195	78,195	78,195	78,195

Note: $^{+}$ $p < 0.1$, * $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered on high school cohort in parentheses. Optimal bandwidth refers to the MSE-optimal bandwidth derived from Calonico et al. (2020). These outcomes correspond to those in Table 6.



Figure D.1: Registered

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.2: Republican

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.3: Democrat or Independent

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.4: Democrat

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.5: No Party Preference

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.6: Third Party

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.7: Democratic Conversion

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.8: Republican Conversion

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.9: Ever Voted

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.10: Total Votes Cast

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.11: Presidential Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.12: Midterm Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.13: General Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.14: Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.15: Republican Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.



Figure D.16: Democratic Primary Votes

Note: The graph reflects the point estimate, 95 percent confidence interval, and 90 percent confidence interval of the effect of the top percent policy on the outcome of interest. Each panel represents a different specification.

E Falsification Test Appendix



Figure E.1: Republican

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsifcation tests described in Section 4.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.



Figure E.2: Democrat or Independent

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsifcation tests described in Section 4.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.



Figure E.3: Republican Conversion

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsifcation tests described in Section 4.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.



Figure E.4: Primary Votes Cast

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsifcation tests described in Section 4.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.



Figure E.5: Democratic Presidential Primary Votes Cast

Note: Each graph reflects the cumulative distribution of estimated t-statistics using the falsifcation tests described in Section 4.2. The red dashed line denotes the t-statistic estimated at the true 96th percentile policy threshold.

F CIRP Entering Freshman Survey Appendix

Table F.1: Political Ideology of Californian Students by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.7	1.5	1.3	2.1	1.2
Conservative	14.6	24.8	17.5	18.6	19.2
Middle of the road	43.1	38.9	47.5	50.0	43.2
Liberal	38.4	31.8	30.8	25.5	33.3
Far left	3.2	3.1	2.9	3.7	3.1
N	120,552	139,172	125,714	9,993	395,431

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table F.2: Economic Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: A national health care plan is needed to cover everybody's medical costs	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	7.2	11.8	7.0	5.5	8.6
Somewhat Disagree	19.4	21.2	18.4	17.3	19.6
Somewhat Agree	43.9	39.8	42.4	42.7	42.1
Strongly Agree	29.5	27.2	32.2	34.5	29.7
N	59,400	55,756	54,829	2,707	172,692
View: Addressing global warming should be a federal priority	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	4.6	10.9	6.8	9.1	7.3
Somewhat Disagree	15.6	19.4	20.1	21.6	18.3
Somewhat Agree	41.9	36.7	42.0	44.6	40.3
Strongly Agree	37.8	33.0	31.1	24.7	34.1
N	25,510	22,801	22,122	287	70,720
View: Federal military spending should be increased	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	29.6	25.1	22.9	20.5	25.8
Somewhat Disagree	49.9	47.3	48.3	46.0	48.4
Somewhat Agree	17.5	23.5	24.2	26.8	21.8
Strongly Agree	3.0	4.1	4.6	6.7	4.0
N	87,181	88,685	79,958	5,558	261,382
View: The federal government is not doing enough to control pollution	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	2.0	3.4	2.8	2.8	2.7
Somewhat Disagree	12.3	16.6	16.0	16.9	14.9
Somewhat Agree	44.4	42.1	44.9	44.7	43.8
Strongly Agree	41.3	38.0	36.4	35.6	38.6
N	59,548	55,938	54,924	2,708	173,118

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table F.3: Economic Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: The federal government should raise taxes to reduce the deficit	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	15.4	19.6	20.8	24.5	18.5
Somewhat Disagree	49.0	48.8	51.2	51.5	49.7
Somewhat Agree	29.7	26.7	23.8	20.7	26.8
Strongly Agree	5.9	4.8	4.2	3.3	5.0
N	50,706	42,123	43,521	1,621	137,971
View: Through hard work, everybody can succeed in American society	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	4.7	5.3	3.8	3.5	4.6
Somewhat Disagree	19.8	21.1	15.5	13.9	18.8
Somewhat Agree	40.2	39.2	37.2	32.6	38.9
Strongly Agree	35.3	34.3	43.4	50.0	37.8
N	51,555	44,693	44,613	2,442	143,303
View: Wealthy people should pay a larger share of taxes than they do now	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	10.8	18.0	13.4	16.6	14.3
Somewhat Disagree	28.7	31.8	30.9	32.6	30.6
Somewhat Agree	40.9	34.9	38.5	34.2	37.9
Strongly Agree	19.5	15.3	17.1	16.6	17.2
N	110,887	132,583	120,352	8,420	372,242

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table F.4: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: Abortion should be legal	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	15.5	27.6	21.3	30.1	22.0
Somewhat Disagree	15.8	14.5	17.6	19.7	16.0
Somewhat Agree	32.4	25.4	31.3	29.2	29.6
Strongly Agree	36.3	32.5	29.7	20.9	32.5
N	114,301	130,571	119,204	10,176	374,252
View: It is important to have laws prohibiting homosexual relationships	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	56.9	52.5	49.2	39.1	52.4
Somewhat Disagree	25.1	23.0	28.1	30.0	25.5
Somewhat Agree	11.6	12.4	13.7	16.8	12.7
Strongly Agree	6.4	12.1	8.9	14.0	9.4
N	103,144	121,853	110,066	8,179	343,242
View: Marijuana should be legalized	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	27.8	32.9	31.2	35.2	30.9
Somewhat Disagree	32.2	28.3	29.1	27.1	29.8
Somewhat Agree	27.7	26.4	26.7	24.1	26.8
Strongly Agree	12.3	12.3	13.0	13.6	12.5
N	113,751	130,050	118,662	10,133	372,596
View: Racial discrimination is no longer a major problem in America	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	38.0	37.0	35.8	35.5	36.9
Somewhat Disagree	45.5	45.4	43.9	40.5	44.8
Somewhat Agree	14.3	15.4	17.3	20.0	15.8
Strongly Agree	2.3	2.2	3.1	4.1	2.6
N	113,962	130,302	118,683	10,106	373,053

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table F.5: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: Same-sex couples should have the right to legal marital status	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	12.5	23.3	16.7	23.2	17.9
Somewhat Disagree	16.4	16.4	18.7	20.9	17.2
Somewhat Agree	29.5	23.7	30.0	29.8	27.6
Strongly Agree	41.7	36.6	34.7	26.1	37.3
N	113,369	129,623	118,132	10,045	371,169
View: The activities of married women are best confined to the home and family	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	61.0	61.6	52.4	41.3	57.9
Somewhat Disagree	21.7	21.4	24.5	28.1	22.7
Somewhat Agree	12.8	12.5	17.1	22.5	14.4
Strongly Agree	4.6	4.4	6.0	8.1	5.1
N	59,179	89,497	75,205	6,681	230,562
View: The death penalty should be abolished	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	20.2	24.1	27.6	30.6	24.2
Somewhat Disagree	41.1	38.1	41.0	37.7	39.9
Somewhat Agree	24.8	22.3	20.6	20.9	22.5
Strongly Agree	13.8	15.4	10.7	10.8	13.3
N	102,917	121,422	109,820	8,147	342,306
View: The federal government should do more to control the sale of handguns	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	4.8	6.8	6.1	6.8	6.0
Somewhat Disagree	13.7	13.9	14.3	13.9	14.0
Somewhat Agree	42.5	38.2	39.2	33.9	39.7
Strongly Agree	39.0	41.1	40.4	45.5	40.3
N	110,705	132,563	119,936	8,438	371,642

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table F.6: Sociocultural Views of Californian Students by Type of College

View: There is too much concern in the courts for the rights of criminals	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	7.9	8.5	6.8	7.7	7.8
Somewhat Disagree	37.5	35.7	30.7	25.8	34.4
Somewhat Agree	47.6	46.9	51.9	52.0	48.9
Strongly Agree	6.9	8.8	10.7	14.6	9.0
N	112,581	128,426	117,293	10,035	368,335
View: Undocumented immigrants should be denied access to public education	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Strongly Disagree	29.8	24.9	32.0	38.4	29.1
Somewhat Disagree	36.3	34.9	30.4	28.3	33.9
Somewhat Agree	22.9	24.8	22.5	19.6	23.3
Strongly Agree	11.0	15.4	15.0	13.6	13.7
N	51,242	44,268	44,369	2,428	142,307

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table F.7: Descriptive Statistics on Californian Students by Type of College

Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
American Indian	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.1
Asian	39.4	15.3	17.8	13.3	23.3
Black	2.5	3.3	4.2	5.0	3.4
Hispanic	14.6	10.4	24.8	45.5	17.2
White	30.1	55.5	38.3	21.8	41.4
Other	3.7	3.0	3.9	4.7	3.5
Two or more race/ethnicity	9.6	12.3	10.9	9.4	11.0
N	124,121	144,094	132,593	11,043	411,851
Citizenship status:	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Neither/None of the above	2.0	3.2	2.1	5.1	2.5
Permanent resident	7.1	2.9	5.4	8.4	5.1
U.S. citizen	91.0	93.9	92.5	86.5	92.4
N	127,474	145,738	136,435	11,304	420,951
Your religious preference	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Protestant	28.8	42.7	33.5	35.9	35.3
Roman Catholic	23.3	25.2	32.2	36.6	27.1
Jewish	3.7	3.3	1.7	0.6	2.8
Other	12.8	6.3	8.8	8.8	9.1
None	31.5	22.6	23.9	18.0	25.6
N	123,909	142,197	130,339	10,591	407,036

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among Californian institutions from 2000 to 2010. "UC" refers to UC freshmen, "Priv" refers to private college freshmen, "CSU" refers to CSU freshmen, and "2-year" refers to two-year college freshmen.

Table F.8: Political Ideology of American Students by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
Far right	1.5	1.8	2.5	1.7
Conservative	21.2	22.3	20.3	21.8
Middle of the road	43.8	45.8	51.9	45.0
Liberal	30.4	26.9	21.3	28.4
Far left	3.0	3.2	4.0	3.1
N	1,655,052	2,060,615	42,014	3,757,681

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among American institutions from 2000 to 2010. "University" refers to research university freshmen, "4-year" refers to teaching college freshmen, and "2-year" refers to community college freshmen.

Table F.9: Descriptive Statistics on American Students by Type of College

Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
American Indian	0.3	0.3	1.6	0.3
Asian	11.4	4.7	4.2	7.6
Black	6.5	8.2	16.8	7.6
Hispanic	5.7	5.1	21.7	5.6
White	68.0	74.1	47.0	71.1
Other	2.2	1.9	3.0	2.0
Two or more race/ethnicity	5.9	5.8	5.7	5.8
N	1,722,161	2,164,260	46,650	3,933,071
Citizenship status:	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
Neither/None of the above	2.1	2.0	2.8	2.0
Permanent resident	3.2	1.8	5.7	2.5
U.S. citizen	94.6	96.2	91.5	95.5
N	1,765,970	2,199,465	47,923	4,013,358
Your religious preference	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
Protestant	40.2	46.8	52.8	44.0
Roman Catholic	27.7	28.4	24.8	28.0
Jewish	4.6	2.3	0.5	3.3
Other	6.9	5.0	7.0	5.9
None	20.7	17.5	14.9	18.9
N	1,708,947	2,133,420	45,219	3,887,586

Note: The data are from HERI's Entering Freshmen Survey among American institutions from 2000 to 2010. "University" refers to research university freshmen, "4-year" refers to teaching college freshmen, and "2-year" refers to community college freshmen.

G HERI Faculty Survey Appendix

Table G.1: Political Ideology of Californian Faculty by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.2
Conservative	8.4	14.8	12.3	20.8	13.2
Middle of the road	34.2	35.5	33.7	42.0	35.2
Liberal	50.4	43.8	46.3	34.0	45.1
Far left	6.9	5.6	7.6	2.8	6.3
N	1,632	2,768	2,640	712	7,752

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.2: Campus Views of Californian Faculty by Type of College

View: Racist/sexist speech should be prohibited on campus	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Disagree strongly	27.2	22.4	20.7	19.9	22.6
Disagree somewhat	24.0	23.6	25.1	19.5	24.0
Agree somewhat	24.2	23.9	24.7	25.2	24.3
Agree strongly	24.6	30.1	29.5	35.4	29.1
N	687	1,261	1,268	226	3,442

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.3: Political Ideology of Californian Faculty by STEM and Type of College

Panel A. STEM Faculty					
	Institution Type				
How would you characterize your political views?	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.0	0.2
Conservative	10.1	14.7	13.7	23.8	13.4
Middle of the road	42.2	38.7	38.7	45.4	40.2
Liberal	45.0	42.7	42.9	29.2	42.7
Far left	2.5	3.7	4.6	1.5	3.5
N	733	653	786	130	2,302
Panel B. Non-STEM Faculty					
	Institution Type				
How would you characterize your political views?	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.0	0.2	0.1	0.5	0.2
Conservative	7.0	14.9	11.7	20.1	13.1
Middle of the road	27.7	34.5	31.6	41.2	33.1
Liberal	54.8	44.2	47.7	35.1	46.2
Far left	10.5	6.2	8.8	3.1	7.5
N	899	2,115	1,854	582	5,450

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.4: Career Objectives of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Objective: Becoming an authority in my field	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	1.5	9.8	9.8	16.4	8.7
Somewhat important	11.5	23.2	25.1	26.5	21.6
Very important	33.2	34.0	34.3	32.0	33.7
Essential	53.8	33.0	30.9	25.1	36.0
N	1,680	2,818	2,685	737	7,920
Objective: Influencing the political structure	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	44.6	39.4	36.5	39.1	39.5
Somewhat important	37.6	40.4	38.5	37.1	38.8
Very important	13.6	15.9	18.1	17.3	16.3
Essential	4.2	4.2	6.9	6.5	5.4
N	1,672	2,809	2,673	734	7,888
Objective: Influencing social values	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	27.4	17.8	17.2	13.6	19.2
Somewhat important	41.1	33.9	38.7	33.5	37.0
Very important	24.0	35.3	31.8	36.5	31.8
Essential	7.5	13.0	12.4	16.5	12.0
N	1,670	2,807	2,676	735	7,888
Objective: Helping to promote racial understanding	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	8.4	6.1	5.8	5.3	6.4
Somewhat important	40.0	31.0	29.1	25.8	31.7
Very important	33.5	36.9	37.8	37.4	36.5
Essential	18.1	26.0	27.4	31.5	25.3
N	1,664	2,804	2,667	737	7,872
Objective: Obtaining recognition from my colleagues for contribution to my field	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	3.0	10.9	9.0	21.6	9.6
Somewhat important	21.9	34.3	34.3	43.7	32.6
Very important	42.1	35.9	37.6	23.6	36.6
Essential	33.0	18.9	19.1	11.1	21.2
N	1,669	2,803	2,675	737	7,884

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.5: Instructional Goals of Californian Faculty by Type of College

UG Goal: Develop moral character	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	14.4	8.0	10.6	5.0	9.9
Somewhat important	41.0	28.7	36.5	26.9	33.8
Very important	29.6	34.5	33.5	37.0	33.4
Essential	14.9	28.9	19.4	31.2	22.9
N	1,569	2,671	2,627	722	7,589
UG Goal: Help students develop personal values	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	12.9	6.4	8.2	4.6	8.2
Somewhat important	40.1	26.9	35.5	23.8	32.3
Very important	33.9	39.5	39.0	44.0	38.6
Essential	13.1	27.2	17.4	27.6	20.9
N	1,565	2,665	2,626	720	7,576
UG Goal: Enhance students' knowledge of and appreciation for other races	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	14.6	10.9	4.6	8.7	9.3
Somewhat important	35.2	24.9	25.8	25.5	27.0
Very important	32.1	33.8	33.2	28.1	32.6
Essential	18.1	30.3	36.4	37.7	31.1
N	321	758	624	231	1,934
UG Goal: Prepare students for responsible citizenship	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	10.5	9.4	6.9	4.8	8.3
Somewhat important	34.8	28.8	27.2	26.7	29.3
Very important	38.2	40.4	38.3	37.4	39.0
Essential	16.5	21.4	27.5	31.2	23.4
N	978	1,739	1,648	439	4,804
UG Goal: Develop ability to think clearly	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not important	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.1
Somewhat important	0.5	0.4	0.7	1.0	0.6
Very important	8.5	11.2	9.4	12.6	10.2
Essential	91.0	88.2	89.9	86.4	89.2
N	1,582	2,683	2,651	723	7,639

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.6: Institutional Goals of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Inst Priority: To promote the intellectual development of students	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	1.6	1.3	3.9	2.4	2.3
Medium priority	10.7	9.8	18.2	13.1	13.2
High priority	33.2	34.7	32.6	37.3	33.9
Highest priority	54.5	54.2	45.3	47.2	50.6
N	1,650	2,784	2,656	718	7,808
Inst Priority: To help students examine and understand their personal values	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	21.0	7.3	17.2	7.9	13.6
Medium priority	45.2	25.8	42.7	34.5	36.4
High priority	27.6	40.1	29.6	37.2	33.6
Highest priority	6.3	26.8	10.5	20.3	16.3
N	1,637	2,775	2,644	718	7,774
Inst Priority: To help students learn how to bring about change in society	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	38.9	23.4	32.1	22.5	29.5
Medium priority	41.8	40.6	40.6	42.7	41.0
High priority	15.8	26.7	20.1	24.7	22.0
Highest priority	3.4	9.3	7.3	10.1	7.4
N	1,616	2,755	2,630	712	7,713
Inst Priority: To maintain a climate where different opinions can be aired	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	5.9	9.6	8.5	8.1	8.1
Medium priority	25.5	27.1	25.4	27.8	26.2
High priority	41.7	40.5	40.4	42.6	41.0
Highest priority	26.9	22.8	25.8	21.5	24.6
N	573	698	733	270	2,274
Inst Priority: To develop among students and faculty multicultural appreciation	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Low priority	9.8	8.8	6.8	6.7	8.1
Medium priority	38.5	33.6	29.3	31.1	33.1
High priority	36.5	39.5	38.9	39.6	38.6
Highest priority	15.2	18.2	25.0	22.6	20.2
N	572	697	737	270	2,276

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.7: Teaching Methods of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Instructional Method: Class discussions	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	8.5	6.7	4.9	6.9	6.5
Some	34.2	21.7	25.8	22.4	25.7
Most	22.8	19.5	21.3	17.9	20.7
All	34.4	52.0	48.0	52.8	47.1
N	1,310	2,244	2,352	665	6,571
Instructional Method: Cooperative learning (small groups)	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	48.4	27.9	26.9	22.6	31.1
Some	35.3	33.8	39.4	34.8	36.2
Most	9.1	15.9	15.6	16.5	14.5
All	7.1	22.5	18.1	26.1	18.2
N	1,305	2,232	2,348	660	6,545
Instructional Method: Experiential learning/Field studies	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	60.9	46.5	48.7	52.4	50.7
Some	25.7	27.9	29.4	24.4	27.7
Most	7.0	11.7	11.7	9.6	10.6
All	6.4	13.9	10.2	13.6	11.0
N	1,294	2,223	2,341	655	6,513
Instructional Method: Teaching assistants	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	25.6	56.4	70.3	79.4	58.5
Some	39.7	22.3	21.6	13.1	24.2
Most	19.0	10.2	4.5	3.3	8.9
All	15.8	11.1	3.6	4.2	8.5
N	774	1,639	1,690	427	4,530

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.8: Teaching Methods of Californian Faculty by Type of College

Instructional Method: Group projects	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	56.2	35.8	37.1	48.0	41.5
Some	34.8	37.9	41.2	31.0	37.8
Most	5.5	13.5	12.2	10.7	11.2
All	3.5	12.8	9.4	10.3	9.5
N	1,297	2,229	2,344	662	6,532
Instructional Method: Extensive lecturing	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	8.1	20.6	15.3	23.8	16.5
Some	21.1	31.6	29.5	30.2	28.6
Most	38.0	27.8	32.5	26.4	31.4
All	32.8	20.1	22.7	19.6	23.5
N	1,304	2,228	2,347	663	6,542
Instructional Method: Readings on racial and ethnic issues	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	73.7	56.2	58.6	62.7	61.2
Some	15.5	25.4	23.5	21.4	22.3
Most	4.8	9.2	9.0	7.4	8.1
All	6.0	9.3	8.9	8.5	8.4
N	1,294	2,227	2,340	660	6,521
Instructional Method: Readings on women and gender issues	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	72.7	56.8	59.0	62.7	61.4
Some	16.6	25.4	24.7	22.4	23.1
Most	5.7	9.2	8.6	8.2	8.2
All	5.0	8.5	7.8	6.7	7.4
N	1,299	2,230	2,344	660	6,533

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.9: Research and Teaching Activity among Californian Faculty by Type of College

Do your interests lie primarily in teaching or research?	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Very heavily in teaching	2.5	26.4	24.4	65.7	24.2
In both, but leaning toward teaching	16.0	33.3	38.2	25.4	30.6
In both, but leaning toward research	62.3	32.9	31.1	7.3	36.2
Very heavily in research	19.2	7.4	6.3	1.6	9.0
N	1,690	2,813	2,697	728	7,928
What is your principal activity in your current position at this institution?	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Administration	10.7	19.2	16.1	20.5	16.5
Teaching	35.5	62.3	70.4	68.1	60.1
Research	47.7	15.3	10.8	0.4	19.1
Services to clients and patients	4.8	1.8	1.2	7.0	2.7
Other	1.3	1.3	1.5	4.0	1.6
N	1,633	2,817	2,683	753	7,886
Publish: Articles in academic or professional journals	Institution Type UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
None	2.4	18.7	12.7	66.1	17.6
1-2	2.8	15.1	14.7	19.6	12.8
3-4	4.0	13.4	14.8	8.2	11.4
5-10	10.4	15.9	18.1	3.7	14.4
11-20	16.4	11.6	15.1	1.2	12.8
21-50	27.9	11.5	13.5	0.8	14.7
51+	36.2	13.8	11.0	0.3	16.4
N	1,666	2,760	2,663	723	7,812

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.10: Descriptive Statistics on Californian Faculty by Type of College

What is your present academic rank?	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Professor	59.7	41.1	55.4	18.5	47.8
Associate Professor	18.3	21.5	15.1	4.6	17.1
Assistant Professor	18.5	17.1	11.9	1.8	14.2
Lecturer	2.3	8.2	13.5	3.4	8.3
Instructor	0.1	6.1	1.5	54.6	7.8
Other	1.1	5.9	2.6	17.3	4.8
N	1,703	2,846	2,720	742	8,011
Race/Ethnicity Group	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
American Indian	0.2	0.2	0.4	0.5	0.3
Asian	8.1	3.8	7.7	4.3	6.0
Black	1.4	1.5	2.6	3.3	2.0
Hispanic	2.7	1.7	5.2	7.2	3.6
White	83.8	88.6	78.7	77.0	83.1
Other	1.6	1.2	2.6	1.5	1.8
Two or more race/ethnicity	2.3	3.0	2.9	6.1	3.1
N	1,675	2,838	2,690	749	7,952
STEM	Institution Type				
	UC	Priv	CSU	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%	%
Not STEM	55.1	76.4	70.5	82.0	70.4
STEM	44.9	23.6	29.5	18.0	29.6
N	1,717	2,895	2,740	760	8,112

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among Californian institutions from 1989 to 1998. "UC" refers to UC faculty, "Priv" refers to private college faculty, "CSU" refers to CSU faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.

Table G.11: Political Ideology of American Faculty by Type of College

How would you characterize your political views?	Institution Type			
	University	4-year	2-year	Total
	%	%	%	%
Far right	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.3
Conservative	13.5	19.2	24.3	16.8
Middle of the road	36.8	39.2	44.8	38.4
Liberal	44.5	37.4	28.2	40.2
Far left	5.0	3.8	2.3	4.3
N	39,220	33,702	6,533	79,455

Note: The data are from HERI's Faculty Survey among American institutions from 1989 to 1998. "University" refers to research university faculty, "4-year" refers to teaching college faculty, and "2-year" refers to community college faculty.